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MAKING THE RIGHT CALL: WHY 
FAIRNESS REQUIRES INDEPENDENT 
APPEALS IN U.S. PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 
LEAGUES 
Historically, the commissioners of the U.S. professional sports league 
have had a duty to preserve the integrity of the leagues.  Developing from 
this concept through collective bargaining between the leagues and 
players’ associations, the disciplinary systems of the leagues are designed 
to keep conflicts out of the U.S. courts.  Recently, these systems have come 
under considerable public scrutiny questioning their fairness and 
effectiveness and, in some cases, the integrity of the commissioners and 
sports.  Specifically, there have been issues with conflict of interest of the 
commissioners and arbitrary decision-making in disciplining players.  
This Comment explores the disciplinary systems of the four major U.S. 
professional sports leagues to determine whether they currently preserve 
justice.  It then examines some of the most successful international sports 
disputes systems as a comparison.  To preserve the public’s faith in the 
integrity of sport, this Comment proposes a new independent arbitral 
body, the American Sports Arbitral Tribunal (ASAT), which would hear 
the disciplinary appeals from these U.S. professional sports leagues, at 
least removing the potential conflict of interest within the current systems.  
Finally, this Comment concludes that the leagues and players’ 
associations would have to help create and incorporate this ASAT, but 
likely will not because nearly all of the collective bargaining negotiations 
involve mainly monetary distribution.  Unfortunately, this may lead to the 
public losing faith in these sports leagues. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Fairness, consistency, and flexibility: these traits are often associated 
with the United States’ legal system,1 but are somehow missing from the 
disciplinary systems of American professional sports leagues.2  
Numerous examples from the four major professional sports leagues3 in 
the United States demonstrate the lack of these traits, and many of them 
will be discussed in this Comment.  While examples from the National 
Football League (NFL), Major League Baseball (MLB), and National 
Basketball Association (NBA) will be discussed in Part II, the National 
Hockey League (NHL) provides several recent examples that will be 
discussed first as an illustration of some common problems with these 
disciplinary systems.4 
The 2012 NHL playoffs were the most violent in recent years, partly 
due to the league office’s inconsistency in doling out discipline.5  For 
 
1. ARIC W. DUTELLE, ETHICS FOR THE PUBLIC SERVICE PROFESSIONAL 107 (2011); J. 
SCOTT HARR ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 51 (5th 
ed. 2012); ALBERT P. MELONE & ALLAN KARNES, THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM: 
PERSPECTIVES, POLITICS, PROCESSES, AND POLICIES 103 (2d ed. 2008); BETH WALSTON-
DUNHAM, INTRODUCTION TO LAW 11, 17, 82 (5th ed. 2009). 
2. Matthew J. Parlow, Professional Sports League Commissioners’ Authority and 
Collective Bargaining, 11 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 179, 202 (2010); David Sirotkin, Note, 
Disciplining the Disciplinary Systems in Professional Sports: An Attempt to Fix the Arbitrary 
and Overreaching Disciplinary Powers of Sports Commissioners, 11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT 
RESOL. 289, 289–92 (2009). 
3. National Football League (NFL), National Basketball Association (NBA), Major 
League Baseball (MLB), and National Hockey League (NHL). 
4. At the time of this writing, the NHL season had been delayed by a collective 
bargaining dispute that finally ended well into the month of January, taking up nearly half the 
season.  Ira Podell & Ronald Blum, Drop the Puck: NHL, Players Settle Labor Dispute, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 6, 2013, available at NEWSBANK, Rec. No. 
95c2ee61e7864e6455367f9d43cab80d.  In conducting its second lockout in a decade, the NHL 
has once again limited its fan base and market power, after what appeared to be an upswing 
in popularity stemming from the 2012 playoffs.  See Jeff Laniado, NHL Playoffs 2012: 3 
Reasons Hockey Is Popular Again in the US, BLEACHER REPORT (Apr. 19, 2012), 
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1152971-2012-nhl-stanley-cup-playoffshow-hockey-has-
once-again-become-popular-in-the-us; Steve Silverman, 8 NHL Teams Who Could Face 
Attendance Issues Due to the Lockout, BLEACHER REPORT (Jan. 14, 2013), 
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1484307-8-nhl-teams-facing-a-big-attendance-issues-due-to-
the-lockout.  The lockout may have once again hindered the NHL from achieving the same 
level of popularity and power as the NBA, MLB, and NFL.  See Podell & Blum, supra; Kurt 
Badenhausen, NHL Lockout Is Over, but Will the Fans Come Back?, FORBES (Jan. 7, 2013, 
10:55 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2013/01/07/nhl-lockout-is-over-but-
will-the-fans-come-back/.  A brief view of the NHL’s structural history will be discussed in 
Part II.D., infra. 
5. Matt Brooks, NHL Playoffs: Carl Hagelin, Matt Carkner Suspensions Continue 
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example, in a first round game, Ottawa Senator Matt Carkner dropped 
his gloves and started punching New York Ranger Brian Boyle, who did 
not drop his gloves, making him an “unwilling combatant.”6  Boyle 
never threw a punch and was knocked to the ground, which typically 
signifies the end of a fight as the referees traditionally step in to separate 
the players, but Carkner kept punching and the referees did not get 
involved.7  Carkner’s actions subjected him to a minor penalty, a major 
penalty, and a game misconduct penalty.8  When the referees failed to 
get involved, fellow Ranger Brandon Dubinsky was the first of 
numerous players to intervene and separate the two.9  According to 
NHL Rule 46.16, referees have discretion to impose a game misconduct 
penalty on an intervening player; further, the game misconduct penalty 
is supposed to be imposed on every additional player involved in the 
same altercation during the same stoppage of play.10  However, the 
 
League’s Inconsistent Rulings, WASH. POST (Apr. 16, 2012, 9:59 AM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/capitals-insider/post/nhl-playoffs-carl-hagelin-matt-
carkner-suspensions-continue-leagues-inconsistent-
rulings/2012/04/16/gIQAzmROLT_blog.html. 
6. NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE OFFICIAL RULES § 6, R. 46.2 (2012–2013) [hereinafter 
NHL OFFICIAL RULES], available at http://www.nhl.com/nhl/en/v3/ext/pdfs/2012-
13_RuleBook.pdf; Brooks, supra note 5. 
7. ROSS BERNSTEIN, THE CODE: THE UNWRITTEN RULES OF FIGHTING AND 
RETALIATION IN THE NHL 73 (2006); Senators’ Matt Carkner Suspended One Game for 
Fighting, SPORTING NEWS, Apr. 15, 2012, http://www.sportingnews.com/nhl/story/2012-04-
15/2012-stanley-cup-playoffs-matt-carkner-brian-boyle-fight-rangers-senators (describing the 
fight).  Carkner had not played earlier in the series and the Rangers had dominated the 
physical play to that point.  See Dominik Jansky, Rangers Vs. Senators, Game 1: Rangers 
Enjoy Spoils of Top Seed, SBNATION.COM (Apr. 13, 2012, 10:03 AM), 
http://www.sbnation.com/nhl/2012/4/13/2945491/new-york-rangers-ottawa-senators-game-1-
nhl-playoffs-2012; Ira Podell, Rangers’ Carl Hagelin Suspended 3 Games, Senators’ Matt 
Carkner Penalized 1 Game, NHL.COM, Apr. 15, 2012, http://www.nhl.com/ice/news.htm?id=6
28081.  It appeared that the Senators’ coach may have turned Carkner loose as a weapon to 
take back momentum and try to win some games.  See Podell, supra; Katie Strang, There Will 
Be Blood . . . and Stitches: Rangers, Senators Understand that Game 2 Nastiness was Just the 
Beginning, ESPNNEWYORK.COM (Apr. 15, 2012, 9:36 AM), http://espn.go.com/new-
york/nhl/story/_/id/7815106/2012-stanley-cup-playoffs-new-york-rangers-ottawa-senators-
ratchet-nastiness. 
8. NHL OFFICIAL RULES, supra note 6, § 4; NHL Suspends Hagelin, Carkner, 
FACEOFF.COM, Apr. 15, 2012, http://www.faceoff.com/suspends+Hagelin+Carkner/6463167/st
ory.html (listing the penalties Carkner received). 
9. Arthur Staple, Boyle, Dubinsky Move on from Game 2 Sideshow, NEWSDAY (Apr. 
15, 2012, 10:04 PM), http://www.newsday.com/sports/hockey/rangers/boyle-dubinsky-move-
on-from-game-2-sideshow-1.3662877. 
10. NHL OFFICIAL RULES, supra note 6, § 6, R. 46.16. 
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2013] MAKING THE RIGHT CALL 473 
referees only gave Dubinsky and Carkner game misconduct penalties.11  
Following the game, NHL Vice President of Player Safety, Brendan 
Shanahan, suspended Carkner for one game, the same amount of time 
Dubinsky would miss from his game misconduct, despite the fact that 
Carkner was a repeat offender and Dubinsky was not, and despite the 
vast difference in their penalties.12 
Later in the series, another Ranger, who had never been suspended 
before, was suspended for three games after being penalized for 
checking Senator’s captain Daniel Alfredsson into the boards, resulting 
in a head injury that caused Alfredsson to leave the game.13  This came 
just days after Shea Weber, the Nashville Predators’ captain, grabbed 
Detroit Red Wing Henrik Zetterberg by the back of the head and 
violently smashed his head into the boards near the end of the game; 
Weber was fined only $2,500 and was not suspended.14 
The only recourse players have when disciplined by the league office 
is an appeal to the NHL Commissioner, which most players find futile 
because of the extremely limited success rate of appeals.15  While these 
situations demonstrate the unfairness, inconsistency, and lack of 
 
11. Steve Zipay, Neil’s OT Goal Give Sens Win Over Rangers, NEWSDAY (Apr. 14, 2012, 
11:48 PM), http://www.newsday.com/sports/hockey/rangers/neil-s-ot-goal-give-sens-win-over-
rangers-1.3661582. 
12. Alex Arthur, Matter of Intent, KING ARTHUR’S COURT (Apr. 19, 2012), 
http://www.tuftsdaily.com/mobile/sports/alex-arthur-king-arthur-s-court-1.2732388; JonRosen, 
Dubinsky to Hear from NHL, L.A. KINGS INSIDER (Feb. 6, 2013 7:26 AM), 
http://lakingsinsider.com/2013/02/06/dubinsky-to-hear-from-nhl/.  Carkner maliciously 
attacked Boyle while Dubinsky stepped in to pull Carkner off of Boyle.  Zipay, supra note 11.  
The NHL also claims that being a repeat offender is taken into consideration when 
determining a penalty.  See infra Part III.D. 
13. Damien Cox, NHL Playoffs Veer Wildly out of Control, THE STAR (Apr. 15, 2012), 
http://www.thestar.com/sports/hockey/2012/04/15/cox_nhl_playoffs_veer_wildly_out_of_contr
ol.html. 
14. Robert MacLeod, Suspensions Have Ruled the NHL Playoffs, The GLOBE AND 
MAIL (June 18, 2012, 10:24 AM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/sports/hockey/suspensions
-have-ruled-the-nhl-playoffs/article4204229/.  Weber then signed a fourteen-year $110 million 
contract over the off-season.  Brian Stubits, Predators Match Shea Weber Offer Sheet, Keep 
Captain in Nashville, CBS SPORTS (July 24, 2012, 3:13 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/nhl/blo
g/eye-on-hockey/19647711/predators-match-shea-weber-offer-sheet-keep-captain-in-
nashville.  Doing the math, his annual salary is now $7.85 million, which makes this fine about 
0.03% of his annual salary and only 2.6% of his salary per game.  Considering the aggressive 
nature of the act and the other punishments handed out for less egregious conduct, this fine is 
an example of why many do not take NHL discipline seriously. 
15. See Matthew Heimlich, Why the NHL Needs an Independent Disciplinary Appeals 
System, SPORTS LAW 101 (Dec. 21, 2011, 1:19 PM), http://www.sportslaw101.com/2011/12/21/
why-the-nhl-needs-an-independent-disciplinary-appeals-system/. 
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474 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:2 
flexibility in the NHL disciplinary process, such circumstances are not 
confined merely to the NHL; they often occur in the other three major 
American professional sports leagues.16 
It is because of this unfairness, inconsistency, and inflexibility that 
this Comment proposes the creation of an American Sports Arbitration 
Tribunal (ASAT), which would be responsible for arbitrating the 
appeals to disciplinary actions of the participating professional leagues.17  
This independent tribunal would provide American professional sports 
leagues with a truly neutral body to hear disciplinary appeals.  The 
ASAT would make the appeals procedure more fair and mitigate the 
problems of the current systems, such as having the commissioner act as 
the judge, jury, and executioner.18  Additionally, this Comment 
recommends that the American professional sports leagues provide a 
detailed outline of what conduct will result in suspension and utilize a 
system where punishments are based on precedent.19 
Part II of this Comment will examine the history of the disciplinary 
process in American professional sports leagues and the role the 
commissioners have played in determining whether the commissioner 
system is fair.  Part III will discuss the current disciplinary processes of 
the leagues under their governing documents to fully explore the 
opportunities for appeal and analyze their effectiveness.  Part IV will 
look at other effective systems of sports discipline around the world, 
specifically the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), the Basketball 
Arbitral Tribunal (BAT), and the National Rugby League’s (NRL) 
system in Australia, to provide some examples of successful structures 
that do not use a commissioner as the ultimate authority and determine 
the applicable and inapplicable aspects of these systems to the American 
professional sports leagues.  Part V will briefly analyze the United States 
legal system’s judicial review to put the American legal standard in 
context.  Part VI will introduce the ASAT and suggest how it could be 
incorporated into the American professional sports systems by 
incorporating different facets from the American leagues’ CBAs and 
those of the global systems analyzed in Part IV.  Part VII will conclude 
with additional recommendations to make professional sports discipline 
 
16. See infra Part II.A–C. 
17. See infra Part IV. 
18. See infra Part III. 
19. See infra Part IV. 
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more effective and consider the likelihood that the ASAT would be 
implemented. 
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMISSIONER POWER IN THE DISCIPLINARY 
PROCESS 
Since the early twentieth century, American sports leagues have 
recognized the need for strong central leadership to enforce the rules, 
discipline the players, and maintain public interest and integrity of the 
game.20  The team owners of the four major American professional 
sports leagues (NFL, MLB, NBA, and NHL) created this central 
authority in the position of the commissioner, giving the ultimate power 
of the entire league to one person.21  While commissioners have been 
instrumental in these leagues’ success, they have not been perfect.22  By 
examining the history of the commissioner system in the four major 
American professional sports leagues, the need for an independent 
tribunal to settle disputes becomes apparent. 
A. Beginnings of the Commissioner in the MLB 
Various situations from the MLB’s history provide examples of the 
flaws of the commissioner system.23  As America’s oldest sports league, 
the MLB has long experienced the inherent unfairness, inconsistency, 
 
20. Parlow, supra note 2, at 181–83. 
21. Id. at 185–87. 
22. See Matthew B. Pachman, Note, Limits on the Discretionary Powers of Professional 
Sports Commissioners: A Historical and Legal Analysis of Issues Raised by the Pete Rose 
Controversy, 76 VA. L. REV. 1409, 1413–18 (1990) (describing several issues with the MLB 
Commissioner’s “nearly unbridled power”); see also Sirotkin, supra note 2, at 306–09 
(describing several disciplinary proceedings where there was a dispute regarding 
commissioner’s power).  The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) pointed out in 1969 
that the internal dispute system was flawed because the commissioner was appointed by the 
owners and would seemingly rule in their favor.  Am. League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 180 
N.L.R.B. 190, 191 (1969).  The NLRB stated, “The system appears to have been designed 
almost entirely by employers and owners, and the final arbiter of internal disputes does not 
appear to be a neutral third party freely chosen by both sides, but rather an individual 
appointed solely by the member club owners themselves.”  Id. (referring to Major League 
Baseball’s arbitration system).  However, this dispute occurred before the players association 
began collectively bargaining with the league, which removed the disputes from the NLRB’s 
jurisdiction because disputes became governed by collective bargaining agreements.  See 
MATTHEW J. MITTEN ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION: CASES, MATERIALS, AND 
PROBLEMS 436 (2d ed. 2009). 
23. See, e.g., Ken Belson, Baseball Fires the Arbitrator Who Overturned Braun’s 50-
Game Suspension, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2012, at B15. 
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and inflexibility that the commissioner structure creates.24  Recent 
arbitration cases over the use of performance-enhancing drugs are 
prime examples of the flaws in the current commissioner system. 
The MLB was the first professional sports league to create a 
“Commissioner” office.25  In 1919, the baseball world was rocked by a 
massive scandal when the infamous Chicago “Black Sox” supposedly 
accepted bribes to fix the World Series.26  Worried about fans’ 
perception, the owners sought to create a position that would protect 
the integrity of the game and nominated United States District Judge 
Kenesaw Mountain Landis for the position.27  Landis took the position 
on the condition that he was granted broad authority to discipline 
players in “the best interest of the game.”28  After letting the legal 
process play out, Landis suspended the eight implicated players for life 
even though they were found not guilty.29  This decision established the 
MLB’s right to discipline its athletes independent of the legal system 
and serves as precedent for enhanced commissioner’s authority under 
the best interests clauses in later Collective Bargaining Agreements 
(CBAs).30 
Commissioner Landis used his broad power to punish anyone he 
believed deserved it.31  For example, a player was arrested for stealing a 
car and receiving stolen cars in 1920 and instead of waiting for the 
criminal trial to finish, Landis suspended the player during the case.32  
After the player was acquitted he applied for reinstatement, but Landis 
 
24. The current disciplinary system is laid out in the 2012–2016 CBA agreement between 
the players association and the owners that is discussed infra Part III.A. 
25. Parlow, supra note 2, at 183. 
26. Mark T. Gould, In Whose “Best Interests”?: The Narrowing Role of Baseball’s 
Commissioner, ENT. & SPORTS LAW., Spring 1994, at 1, 19. 
27. Id. 
28. Adam Epstein, An Exploration of Interesting Clauses in Sports, 21 J. LEGAL 
ASPECTS SPORT 5, 12 (2011).  Even the selection of Landis as commissioner can be viewed 
skeptically because he was the judge that ruled in favor of Major League Baseball (then 
Organized Baseball) when it was sued in an antitrust case by Federal Baseball.  Jason M. 
Pollack, Take My Arbitrator, Please: Commissioner “Best Interests” Disciplinary Authority in 
Professional Sports, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1645, 1650 (1999). 
29. Pollack, supra note 28, at 1652.  Landis likely chose this course of action to counter 
the seemingly unfair trial where the players’ confessions “mysteriously disappeared” and the 
jurors carried the players out of the courtroom on their shoulders in celebration.  Id. 
30. Id. at 1653–54. 
31. See id. at 1653–56 (noting Commissioner Landis’s use of broad authority during the 
1920s). 
32. Id. at 1654. 
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determined the player should have been found guilty and suspended the 
player for life.33  In the only case to challenge his unfettered authority, 
an Illinois district court affirmed the Commissioner’s power when it held 
that Landis’s decisions were absolute and binding because the owners 
intended to give him such power.34  As the first commissioner, Landis 
shaped the nature of the position and established a precedent for his 
future successors to do nearly anything they would want.35 
The next major event that changed the scope of disciplinary 
authority occurred in 1970 when the head of the MLB Players 
Association (MLBPA) successfully bargained for an independent 
arbitrator to handle labor disputes and conflicts arising from the CBA.36  
Then-Commissioner Bowie Kuhn maintained the authority to handle 
issues that only involved the integrity of the game or the public’s faith in 
baseball.37  The independent arbitrator was first utilized during the 1970 
season when the California Angels attempted to suspend an outfielder 
for “lackadaisical play.”38  The arbitrator overturned the suspension 
after finding that the player was “emotionally ill and belonged on the 
disabled list.”39 
In 1989, Commissioner A. Bartlett Giamatti regained some of the 
position’s power when he banned Pete Rose from baseball for life for 
betting on baseball games in which he was the manager of one of the 
 
33. Id. at 1654–55.  Then in 1921, Landis suspended Babe Ruth and any New York 
Yankee that “barnstormed” after winning the World Series.  Id. at 1655–56.  Barnstorming 
involves players touring the country and playing pick-up games against non-professional 
teams for money.  See id. at 1655 n.76; History of Barnstorming, BARNSTORMERSBASEBALL.
COM, http://www.barnstormersbaseball.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&i
d=636&Itemid=191 (last visited Oct. 15, 2013). 
34. See Milwaukee Am. Ass’n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298, 302 (N.D. Ill. 1931) (holding that 
“it was the intent of the parties to make the commissioner an arbiter, whose decisions made in 
good faith, upon evidence, upon all questions relating to the purpose of the organization and 
all conduct detrimental thereto, should be absolutely binding”). 
35. See Pollack, supra note 28, at 1658. 
36. Id. at 1662–63. 
37. Id. at 1662. 
38. Id. at 1663. 
39. Id.  Commissioner Kuhn’s power took another big hit when he attempted to suspend 
Texas Ranger player Ferguson Jenkins after Jenkins was arrested in an airport for possession 
of two ounces of marijuana, two grams of hashish, and four grams of cocaine.  Id. at 1668.  
When the union filed a grievance, the arbitrator found that the suspension was the result of 
“mere surmise,” and Jenkins escaped suspension, despite the fact he was convicted.  Id. at 
1668–69.  Then in 1984, a pitcher was arrested in the Dominican Republic for possession of 
cocaine; after the Commissioner suspended him the MLBPA filed a grievance, but the 
arbitrator overturned the suspension.  Id. at 1669. 
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teams.40  One reason for the intensity of the suspension was because 
Rose did not admit to gambling; in fact, he fought the accusation for 
fourteen years before finally coming clean.41  Initially, Rose challenged 
Commissioner Giamatti’s conduct in investigating Rose’s illegal 
gambling activities, but the Ohio district court held that Commissioner 
Giamatti was well within the authority granted to him by the CBA.42  
While this was a move towards more deference to the commissioner’s 
discretion, Rose was disciplined as a manager, not as a player; thus, he 
did not have the benefit of the MLBPA or a CBA to fight the 
suspension.43 
After the recreational drug issues in the 1980s,44 the next major issue 
to shape the commissioner’s ability to discipline players arose at the turn 
of the twenty-first century in the midst of what is now referred to as “the 
Steroid Era.”45  The MLB instituted a drug testing policy in 2005 and 
created a five-strike suspension test that started at ten days for the first 
offense.46  When evidence came out that the steroid problem was bigger 
than he thought, Commissioner Bud Selig created a new disciplinary 
system for performance-enhancing drugs: fifty games for the first 
positive test, one hundred games for the second, and a lifetime ban for 
the third.47  This policy imposes a strict liability standard using zero 
tolerance that does not take into account any circumstances of particular 
situations.48 
 
40. Matthew A. Foote, Three Strikes and You’re (Not Necessarily) Out: How Baseball’s 
Erratic Approach to Conduct Violations Is Not in the Best Interest of the Game, 6 DEPAUL J. 
SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 13 (2009). 
41. Id. at 14. 
42. Rose v. Giamatti, 721 F. Supp. 906, 918–19 (S.D. Ohio 1989). 
43. See Foote, supra note 40, at 15. 
44. See id. at 17–25.  See generally Ed Magnuson, Baseball’s Drug Scandal, TIME, Sept. 
16, 1985, at 26 (discussing drug abuse by MLB players in the 1980s). 
45. See Foote, supra note 40, at 25–29. 
46. Steroid Suspensions, BASEBALL ALMANAC, http://www.baseball-
almanac.com/legendary/steroids_baseball.shtml (last visited Oct. 15, 2013). 
47. Jonathan Bass, Bud Selig’s Tenure as MLB Commissioner Takes Path Similar to 
Recovering Addict, GAMEDAYR (Aug. 21, 2013, 2:54 PM), http://gamedayr.com/sports/bud-
selig-mlb-commissioner-tenure-recovering-addict/; Steroid Suspensions, supra note 46.  This 
disciplinary system for performance-enhancing drugs remains in use. 
48. Foote, supra note 40, at 31–32.  This is going to be even more applicable if the MLB 
decides to create harsher penalties for violating the Joint Drug Agreement because of the 
extent of the Biogenesis scandal.  See Richard Justice, Majority of Players Want Tougher 
PED Penalties, MLB.COM (Feb. 26, 2013, 12:05 PM), http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ym
d=20130226&content_id=42006512&vkey=news_mlb&c_id=mlb (noting that players are 
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The unfairness of such a standard was well illustrated when former 
Philadelphia Phillies pitcher J.C. Romero was suspended for testing 
positive for a performance-enhancing drug before a World Series 
game.49  The positive test resulted from a banned ingredient found in a 
supplement he had purchased from a local General Nutrition Store 
(GNC) that was mislabeled to show that it did not include the banned 
ingredient.50  Romero took the supplement after the MLBPA had 
circulated a memo that said any supplements purchasable at GNC were 
approved.51  Moreover, the League suspended Romero despite the fact 
he had checked with two nutritionists and his strength and conditioning 
coach to confirm the supplement was approved.52  Romero served a fifty 
game suspension after he refused the MLB’s offer of a twenty-five game 
suspension if he would admit guilt.53 
One of the least fair aspects of the appeal system in the MLB is the 
fact that the league can fire an “independent” arbitrator at any time, 
without cause, and has recently done so with an arbitrator that ruled 
against it.54  In February 2012, Ryan Braun became the first player to 
successfully appeal a performance-enhancing drug related suspension in 
arbitration against the league.55  Braun was able to win the appeal 
despite not challenging the science of the test or proving tampering, but 
simply by arguing a procedural error.56  While the hearing was held 
 
pushing for harsher penalties in light of the Biogenesis scandal); Ron Matejko, Bud Selig: 
Stricter Drug Penalties, ESPNDALLAS.COM (Mar. 2, 2013, 7:23 PM), http://espn.go.com/mlb/s
pring2013/story/_/id/9008032/bud-selig-calls-tougher-drug-penalties-violations (explaining 
that Commissioner Selig is pushing for harsher penalties); MLB Suspends 13, Including A-
Rod, ESPN.COM (Aug. 6, 2013, 12:06 PM), http://espn.go.com/mlb/story/_/id/9540755/mlb-
bans-13-including-alex-rodriguez-new-york-yankees-2014 (detailing the extent of the 
Biogenesis scandal). 
49. Foote, supra note 40, at 31. 
50. Id. at 31–32.  Romero did not name the particular supplement he used from GNC.  
Peter Gammons, Suspended Romero ‘Didn’t Cheat,’ ESPN.COM (Jan. 6, 2009, 1:36 PM), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=3812334. 
51. Foote, supra note 40, at 31. 
52. Id. 
53. Gammons, supra note 50.  Luckily, the appeal took place during the World Series 
and Romero was permitted to pitch.  Id. 
54. 30 MAJOR LEAGUE CLUBS & MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ASS’N., 2012–
2016 BASIC AGREEMENT art. XI, § A(9) (2011) [hereinafter MLB CBA], available at 
http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_english.pdf; Belson, supra note 23. 
55. Ken Belson & Michael S. Schmidt, Star Player First to Win Appeal on a Drug Test, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2012, at A1. 
56. Id.; see also Jeré Longman, A Flawed Policy for Drug Testing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 
2012, at SP9.  Braun’s representatives publicly denigrated the man who collected Braun’s 
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480 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:2 
before an “independent” arbitration tribunal,57 the lead arbitrator, who 
had served as the independent arbitrator for longer than any of his 
predecessors, was fired by MLB three months after he ruled against the 
league.58  This situation shows that the appeals process may not actually 
be impartial.59 
Not only can either party fire an arbitrator, but each party can select 
an arbitrator, who is not required to be impartial, to sit on the panel 
with a single impartial arbitrator responsible for making the decision.60  
 
sample, calling his actions “inappropriate.”  Ronald Blum, David Cornwell, Ryan Braun’s 
Lawyer, Criticizes Drug Collector Dino Laurenzi Jr., HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 1, 2012, 6:56 
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/01/david-cornwell-ryan-braun-dino-laurenzi_n_ 
1315064.html.  Braun would later agree to a sixty-five-game suspension for violation of the 
Joint Drug Agreement and publicly “apologize.”  Erik Brady, Brewers’ Ryan Braun 
Suspended for Rest of Season, USA TODAY (July 22, 2013, 11:51 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/mlb/brewers/2013/07/22/ryan-braun-suspended-
milwaukee-season/2576215/.  He finally admitted to using performance-enhancing drugs in a 
scripted statement he and his representatives sent out to the media in late August 2013.  Ryan 
Braun’s Full Statement, ESPN.COM (Aug. 22, 2013, 8:01 PM), http://espn.go.com/mlb/story/_/i
d/9592973/ryan-braun-full-statement-admitting-ped-use. 
57. Belson, supra note 23.  The MLB uses a three-person arbitration panel for these 
disputes; composed of two-party arbitrators, one chosen by the league and one by the players’ 
association, and one independent arbitrator appointed by the agreement of both.  MLB CBA, 
supra note 54, at art. XI, § A(9). 
58. Belson, supra note 23.  The arbitrator had served for thirteen years arbitrating cases 
between the union and the league.  Id.  His ruling provided precedent for other players in 
similar situations to escape suspension based on procedural errors, though the league and 
union are revising the language of the policy to eliminate any ambiguity and make the system 
stricter and more difficult to appeal.  Id. 
59. According to the CBA, either the league or the players association can terminate 
any arbitrator for any reason, as long as that arbitrator is not currently hearing a case.  MLB 
CBA, supra note 54, at art. XI, § A(9).  The American Arbitration Association (AAA) 
submits a list of arbitrators to serve as MLB arbitrators, and when the Players Association 
and League cannot agree on the impartial arbitrator for a case, they narrow the list by striking 
names until only one remains and he or she is the arbitrator for that hearing.  Id. 
60. See Longman, supra note 56; see also MLB CBA, supra note 54, at art. XI, § A(9); 
Belson & Schmidt, supra note 55.  This system will be tested soon when Alex Rodriguez and 
his legal team bring their appeal to his 211-game suspension, the largest suspension ever.  Ted 
Keith, A-Rod Suspended  Through 2014 , Wi l l  Appeal ; 12  Others  Given  Lesser  
Bans , MLBSI.COM (Aug. 5, 2013), http://mlb.si.com/2013/08/05/a-rod-suspended-through-
2014-will-appeal-12-others-given-lesser-bans/; Travis Waldron, The List of Baseball Players 
Suspended in the Biogenesis Scandal, THINKPROGRESS (Aug. 5, 2013, 1:45 PM), 
http://thinkprogress.org/sports/2013/08/05/2414251/the-list-of-baseball-players-suspended-in-
the-biogenesis-scandal/.  Rodriguez was one of fourteen players suspended, but was the only 
one to file a formal appeal and will likely argue that he is being treated arbitrarily.  Barry 
Petchesky, The Full List of Suspended Biogenesis Clients, DEADSPIN (Aug. 5, 2013, 12:46 
PM), http://deadspin.com/the-full-list-of-suspended-biogenesis-clients-1029648603; Tom Van 
Riper, Baseball Dishes Out Biogenesis Suspensions—Don’t Expect Much Damage, FORBES 
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2013] MAKING THE RIGHT CALL 481 
While the “independent” arbitrator ruled in this case, the fact that he 
was fired shows that the ultimate authority may still lie with the 
commissioner.61 
The initial authority granted to the MLB Commissioner gave him so 
much power that he could discipline a player who was found not guilty 
of charges.62  This is unfair because the disciplinary system, much like 
U.S. societal and legal norms, is supposed to presume the innocence of 
the accused until proven guilty.63  Though the commissioner’s power has 
undergone changes based on independent arbitration, the League now 
has the ability to fire arbitrators, which gives an arbitrator an incentive 
to rule in favor of the League in order to retain employment.64  The 
League has also shown inflexibility in its handling of drug violations, 
leaving the players completely responsible for league, team, and 
manufacturer negligence.65  These are among the issues that illustrate 
the need for a new appeal system in the MLB. 
 
(Aug. 5, 2013, 3:06 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomvanriper/2013/08/05/baseball-dishes-
out-biogenesis-suspensions-I-expect-much-damage/. 
61. Since the League is more frequently involved in arbitration than the association 
(because the player can elect union representation but is not required to use it), the 
“impartial” arbitrators have an incentive to not make a decision against the League office.  
See HON. MING W. CHIN ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: EMPLOYMENT 
LITIGATION 18:665 (2012); MLB CBA, supra note 54, at art. XI, § A(9).  The system 
explained in the CBA prevents an arbitrator from making an obvious arbitrary or capricious 
decision, which is already generally prohibited by the laws regarding arbitration.  MLB CBA, 
supra note 54, at art. XI, § A(9); CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL MODEL 462 (2d ed. 2011) (citing Federal 
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1925)).  The MLB’s arbitration procedure provides no 
additional protection of impartiality, and in fact gives reason to believe the arbitrators would 
not be impartial.  See supra notes 54–60 and accompanying text. 
62. Pollack, supra note 28, at 1654–55. 
63. See Coffin v. U.S., 156 U.S. 432, 458–60 (1895); PATRICK K. THORNTON ET AL., 
SPORTS ETHICS FOR SPORTS MANAGEMENT PROFESSIONALS 433 (2012); Parlow, supra note 
2, at 201. 
64. Belson, supra note 23.  This pressure on the arbitrator to rule for the League 
illustrates the unfairness of the arbitration system. 
65. See Christian Red, J.C. Romero, Former Phillies Reliever Suspended for Performance 
Enhancing Drugs, Settles Lawsuit, Says ‘Justice Is Served’ After Supplement is Tainted, N.Y. 
DAILY NEWS (Jan. 10, 2012, 3:24 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/i-team/romero-
phillies-reliever-suspended-performance-enhancing-drugs-settles-lawsuit-justice-served-
supplement-tainted-article-1.1003730 (explaining that J.C. Romero was suspended for fifty 
games after an over-the-counter supplement he was taking was later found to contain banned 
substances).  No system of strict liability should exist in the sports world.  See infra Part V.  At 
the very least, players like Romero should be rewarded with the benefit of the doubt when 
they go through the effort to double-check with their teams or the League to make sure a 
substance is legal and are clearly not at fault.  See infra Part V.  The lack of any room for 
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482 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:2 
B. History and Issues with the NFL’s Commissioner 
While the current system of NFL discipline and appeals is likely the 
most flexible of the major American professional sports leagues, it is still 
fraught with unfairness and inconsistency.  The current commissioner, 
Roger Goodell, has imposed a nearly dictatorial rule: he has the right to 
both hand out discipline, directly or indirectly, and rule on the appeal 
thereof.66  As the League has evolved, so has the commissioner’s power; 
it has grown to such a level that problems are becoming more evident 
and there is a dire need to alter the system.67 
The owners first granted significant authority to Commissioner Pete 
Rozelle, the third man to hold the position, partially because he was 
able to bring financial solvency to the League.68  NFL owners granted 
Rozelle similar authority to MLB Commissioner Landis, but unlike the 
MLB, the NFL did not have an arbitration procedure in the CBA for 
discipline.69  Rozelle attempted to institute a drug-testing policy in the 
NFL but the NFL Players Association (NFLPA) would not agree to it, 
and an arbitrator ruled that instituting the testing policy was beyond the 
commissioner’s power under the CBA.70  In 2000, Commissioner Paul 
Tagliabue was empowered to suspend players for off-the-field conduct 
under the League’s first Personal Conduct Policy (PCP).71  While 
Tagliabue gradually increased the power and authority of his position, 
his power is dwarfed in comparison to his successor, Roger Goodell.72 
 
error by anyone involved and only disciplining the player shows the flaws with the current 
system.  See supra notes 48–53 and accompanying text. 
66. Joshua A. Reece, Note, Throwing the Red Flag on the Commissioner: How 
Independent Arbitrators Can Fit into the NFL’s Off-Field Discipline Procedures Under the 
NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 359, 360 (2010). 
67. See, e.g., Jarrett Bell, Bounty Ruling Proves Goodell Was Sloppy, USA TODAY 
(Dec. 12, 2012, 3:52 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2012/12/11/chicago-bell-
paul-tagliabue-roger-goodell-bounty-scandal-was-just-a-witch-hunt/1762007/. 
68. Parlow, supra note 2, at 187. 
69. Id.; Robert I. Lockwood, Comment, The Best Interests of the League: Referee Betting 
Scandal Brings Commissioner Authority and Collective Bargaining Back to the Frontcourt in 
the NBA, 15 SPORTS LAW. J. 137, 146–47 (2008). 
70. Colin J. Daniels & Aaron Brooks, From the Black Sox to the Sky Box: The Evolution 
and Mechanics of Commissioner Authority, 10 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 23, 32 (2008). 
71. Marc Edelman, Are Commissioner Suspensions Really Any Different From Illegal 
Group Boycotts? Analyzing Whether the NFL Personal Conduct Policy Illegally Restrains 
Trade, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 631, 636–37 (2009). 
72. Id.  Under the most recent CBA, the commissioner has the authority to name the 
officer to hear a discipline appeal and can elect to hear it himself at his discretion.  NAT’L 
FOOTBALL LEAGUE & NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASS’N., COLLECTIVE 
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In August 2006, the owners elected Roger Goodell to serve as 
commissioner.73  Soon after accepting this position, Goodell 
strengthened the PCP by making it stricter and applying it to a broader 
range of conduct.74  The PCP is not part of the CBA, so any discipline 
that arises from it is not subject to the CBA’s arbitration provision.75  
Instead, under the CBA, the commissioner, through himself or an 
appointee, is the appellate body for all player discipline grievances.76  
Goodell has used his authority under the PCP to suspend numerous 
athletes without giving them an opportunity to seek an appeal from an 
independent arbitrator.77  While the PCP contains a limited list of 
conduct that may lead to discipline, the list is vague and can be 
interpreted as broadly as the commissioner wishes.78  Moreover, it does 
not contain an outline of potential disciplinary sanctions, but instead 
states that discipline will be handed down “as warranted.”79  This clause 
creates suspicion of potential arbitrariness of discipline under the PCP 
because it makes the commissioner “the judge, jury and executioner.”80  
This power demonstrates the unfairness in the system because the 
commissioner has no check on his authority and the governing 
 
BARGAINING AGREEMENT art. 46, § 2(a) (2011) [hereinafter NFL CBA], available at 
http://images.nflplayers.com/mediaResources/files/PDFs/General/2011_Final_CBA.pdf. 
73. Robert Ambrose, Note, The NFL Makes It Rain: Through Strict Enforcement of Its 
Conduct Policy, the NFL Protects Its Integrity, Wealth, and Popularity, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 1069, 1087 (2008). 
74. Edelman, supra note 71, at 637. 
75. Id. at 638. 
76. NFL CBA, supra note 72, at art. 46; Casinova O. Henderson, How Much Discretion 
Is Too Much for the NFL Commissioner to Have Over the Players Off-the-Field Conduct?, 17 
SPORTS LAW. J. 167, 170–71 (2010); Sirotkin, supra note 2, at 300. 
77. Sirotkin, supra note 2, at 301 (providing several examples of Commissioner Goodell 
handing out discipline). 
78. Logan O’Shaughnessy, After Review: An Open Letter to NFL Commissioner Roger 
Goodell Suggesting That Limiting the League’s Disciplinary Power Under the Personal 
Conduct Policy May Be in the League’s Best Interests, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 527, 534–35 
(2011) (citing NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, PERSONAL CONDUCT POLICY (2008), available at 
https://web.archive.org/web/20101228103442/http://images.nflplayers.com/mediaResources/im
ages/oldImages/fck/NFL%20Personal%20Conduct%20Policy%202008.pdf (accessed by 
entering URL in the Internet Archive index)); see also NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, 
PERSONAL CONDUCT POLICY (2012) [hereinafter NFL PCP], available at 
http://nfllabor.files.wordpress.com/2013/06/personal-conduct-policy.pdf. 
79. O’Shaughnessy, supra note 78, at 535–36. 
80. Id. at 536; Michael McCann, Overturning of Bounty Suspensions Backs Goodell into 
a Corner, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 7, 2012, 6:46 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/201
2/writers/michael_mccann/09/07/saints-suspensions-overturned/index.html. 
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documents do not provide specific guidelines for conduct that may be 
disciplined, or the punishments to be imposed.81 
Questions of subjective arbitrariness also arise regarding the player 
discipline system because similar situations have not been treated 
consistently.82  For instance, a player was arrested for DUI after he hit a 
parked car and then failed a breathalyzer test; the League fined him 
under the Substance Abuse Policy.83  One year earlier, the League 
suspended another player for three games under the PCP after he was 
arrested on suspicion of drunk driving, but did not get in an accident.84 
Another example that creates questions about the objectivity and 
consistency of the commissioner is the suspension of New Orleans 
Saints’ head coach, Sean Payton.85  Goodell suspended Payton for a year 
for not stopping a “cash-for-hits” pool that the Saints operated—where 
players received monetary payments for big hits, injuring opposing 
players, and making impactful plays—dubbed “Bounty-Gate.”86  
 
81. See generally infra Part III.B (discussing the governing NFL documents). 
82. O’Shaughnessy, supra note 78, at 537. 
83. Id. at 537–39.  Cincinnati Bengals’ linebacker Rey Maualuga registered a 0.157 blood 
alcohol content when police issued the breathalyzer.  Id. at 537–38; Ray Slover, Bengals’ Rey 
Maualuga Fined; Suspension Revoked, SPORTNINGNEWS NFL (Aug. 17, 2010, 10:39 PM), 
http://www.sportingnews.com/nfl/story/2010-08-17/bengals-rey-maualuga-fined-suspension-
revoked.  He received a suspended-seven day jail sentence, his license was suspended for 
ninety days, and he did not help the circumstances by having an underage girl in the car.  Id. 
84. O’Shaughnessy, supra note 78, at 539.  During the 2013 summer, Goodell did not 
punish Eagles’ wide receiver Riley Cooper for publicly using a racial slur in a video-taped 
rant at a concert.  Sam Farmer, Roger Goodell: Team Punishment of Riley Cooper Is Enough, 
L.A. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/sports/sportsnow/la-sp-sn-cooper-goodell-
20130801,0,3229785.story#axzz2cdh18U7E.  Goodell cited the CBA policy that the League 
does not punish a player for the same incident if he has already been punished by his team.  
Id.  He also deflected a comparison of the slur Cooper used to the name Redskins, which has 
come under criticism of no longer being acceptable.  Id.  The League has also come under 
much public disparagement for its seemingly arbitrary policing of fineable hits.  See Jeff 
Dickerson, Jon Bostic Fined $21K for Hit, ESPNCHICAGO.COM (Aug. 21, 2013, 4:20 PM), 
http://espn.go.com/chicago/nfl/story/_/id/9587983/jon-bostic-chicago-bears-fined-21000-hit-
mike-willie-san-diego-chargers. 
85. See Chris Smith, Roger Goodell Is Not Serious About Player Safety, and It’s Because 
of Money, FORBES (Mar. 22, 2012, 11:41 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2012/03
/22/roger-goodell-nfl-are-not-serious-about-player-safety-and-its-because-of-money/. 
86. Appeal Seeks Roger Goodell Recusal, ESPN.COM (Oct. 12, 2012, 8:03 PM), 
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/8493998/bounty-scandal-jonathan-vilma-others-appeal-seeks-
roger-goodell-recusal-sources-say; What Does Bounty-Gate Mean?, SPORTINGCHARTS.COM, 
http://www.sportingcharts.com/dictionary/nfl/bounty-gate.aspx (last visited Oct. 15, 2013).  
The last person to receive a full-year suspension was Donte Stallworth, who killed a person in 
a drunk-driving accident.  Smith, supra note 85. 
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2013] MAKING THE RIGHT CALL 485 
Commissioner Goodell also fined the Saints organization a half-million 
dollars and usurped the organization’s second-round draft pick for the 
next two NFL Drafts.87  This was the most significant scandal since the 
New England Patriots and coach Bill Belichick were found to have 
videotaped opposing teams’ practices.88  In response to the Patriots’ 
actions, Goodell fined the Patriots a quarter-million dollars, seized one 
first-round draft pick, and fined Belichick a half-million dollars, but did 
not suspend him.89  The League also claimed it destroyed the videotape 
evidence and originally refused to release the number of tapes or what 
they contained.90 
While Belichick explicitly broke an NFL rule and Payton condoned 
a system that nearly every team around the League operates to some 
extent,91 Belichick merely received a fine, which equates to about twelve 
percent of his 2007 salary, and Payton was suspended without pay for a 
year, equivalent to the nearly seven million dollars he would have made, 
and lost the opportunity to coach a team that had been a perennial 
championship contender.92  This marked an unprecedented increase in 
punishment and illustrates the inconsistency of Commissioner Goodell’s 
punishments.  If the NFL had a more detailed governing document 
explaining the illegal conduct, players and coaches would know what 
conduct to avoid.  There would be fewer appeals if this document had 
explicit punishments for these actions.  Further, if the appeals that 
 
87. Id.  Additionally, the defensive coordinator said to have run the system was 
suspended indefinitely, the general manager was suspended for half of the season, and an 
assistant coach was suspended for six games.  Roundup: All Bountygate Penalties Against 
Saints, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 2, 2012, http://www.stltoday.com/roundup-all-
bountygate-penalties-against-saints/article_ab7bd2c6-948b-11e1-89ce-0019bb30f31a.html. 
88. Judy Battista, Patriots Were Questioned on Videotaping Claims, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 
2008, at D2. 
89. Id.; Greg Bishop, Questions Linger About Why N.F.L. Destroyed Patriots’ Tapes, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2007, at SP1; Belichick Draws $500,000 Fine, but Avoids Suspension, 
ESPN.COM (Sep. 14, 2007, 10:16 AM), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3018338. 
90. Battista, supra note 88; Bishop, supra note 89.  In response to Senator Arlen 
Specter’s public demand, it has come out that the League received eight tapes, recording 
play-calling from five teams in six games.  Timeline of Events Surrounding Patriots’ 
Videotaping Scandal, NFL.COM (July 26, 2012, 8:21 PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0900
0d5d8084899e/article/timeline-of-events-surrounding-patriots-videotaping-scandal. 
91. Smith, supra note 85. 
92. Kristi Dosh, Bill Belichick Highest-Paid Coach—Again, ESPN.COM (May 16, 2012, 
5:28 PM), http://espn.go.com/blog/playbook/dollars/post/_/id/719/bill-belichick-highest-paid-
coach-again; Smith, supra note 85; Belichick Draws $500,000 Fine, but Avoids Suspension, 
supra note 89. 
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resulted from disciplinary action were heard by an independent tribunal, 
then it could use a system of precedent and make sure the punishments 
are consistent.  Such a system may have prevented the debacle that 
occurred from the suspensions of players involved in the scandal. 
In addition to the discipline against the Saints organization and the 
coaches for Bounty-Gate, Commissioner Goodell suspended four Saints 
players accused of being the ring leaders of, and participating in, the 
bounty pool.93  The players filed a grievance under the CBA claiming 
that Goodell had abused his power in suspending them.94  Under the 
CBA, this type of grievance is heard by a three-member panel of 
arbitrators.95  Not only did the players appeal the suspensions, but one 
also sued Goodell for defamation.96  An independent arbitration panel 
overturned the suspensions and mandated that Goodell could only 
reissue the suspensions if he found “there was intent to injure beyond 
creating incentives for performance.”97  Goodell promptly reissued two 
of the suspensions and adjusted the remaining two.98  When the players 
appealed that decision, Goodell announced that his predecessor as 
Commissioner, Paul Tagliabue, a lawyer, would hear the appeals instead 
of Goodell.99 
Tagliabue then issued a decision that vacated the players’ 
suspensions but defended Commissioner Goodell’s findings.100  He 
 
93. Appeal Seeks Roger Goodell Recusal, supra note 86.  Defensive lineman Anthony 
Hargrove was originally suspended for eight games; outside linebacker Scott Fujita was 
suspended for three games; defensive end Will Smith was suspended for four games; and 
middle linebacker Jonathan Vilma was suspended for an entire season.  Roundup: All 
Bountygate Penalties Against Saints, supra note 87. 
94. See McCann, supra note 80; Appeal Seeks Roger Goodell Recusal, supra note 86. 
95. McCann, supra note 80; Appeal Seeks Roger Goodell Recusal, supra note 86. 
96. Appeal Seeks Roger Goodell Recusal, supra note 86; see also Vilma v. Goodell, 917 F. 
Supp. 2d 591 (E.D. La. 2013).  A judge dismissed the suit according to a rule that prevents 
players from suing the commissioner for discipline resulting from a collective bargaining 
agreement’s arbitration proceeding.  Id. at 595–96; Jonathan Stempel, Judge Throws Out 
Defamation Case Against NFL Commissioner, REUTERS (Jan. 17, 2013, 7:40 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/18/us-nfl-vilma-lawsuit-idUSBRE90H00W20130118. 
97. McCann, supra note 80. 
98. Appeal Seeks Roger Goodell Recusal, supra note 86. 
99. Judy Battista, Tagliabue to Hear Appeals in Bounty Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2012, 
at D6.  By doing so, the Commissioner implicitly acknowledged that a conflict of interest 
existed and the system is inherently unfair. 
100. Will Brinson, Paul Tagliabue ‘Vacates All Player Discipline’ in Saints Bounty Case, 
CBSSPORTS.COM (Dec. 11, 2012, 1:20 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/blog/eye-on-
football/21362069/paul-tagliabue-vacates-all-player-discipline-in-saints-bounty-case. 
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2013] MAKING THE RIGHT CALL 487 
believed that the process of acquiring facts and enforcing discipline 
should have taken weeks, but the league office was misled by members 
of the Saints organization, which caused it to take more than three 
years.101  Tagliabue also determined that the players’ suspensions were 
unwarranted because they were grossly disproportionate to the 
precedential punishment for similar actions.102  While the ex-
Commissioner found that the players’ conduct was detrimental to the 
game, he vacated the punishments because of a lack of necessary 
evidence and conflicting reports from team officials.103  This decision 
implicitly stated that in suspending the players, Commissioner Goodell 
had been overly harsh, which ultimately diminished his power as 
commissioner to determine punishments and revealed that the penalties 
were unfair and inconsistent.104  Tagliabue demonstrated the flexibility 
that only an independent arbitrator can truly have, and that the 
commissioner certainly lacks, in this type of situation.  If these disputes 
were designed to be heard by an independent tribunal, like the ASAT, 
these procedural ills would be eliminated. 
The circular nature of the NFL’s disciplinary process was evidenced 
by Bounty-Gate.105  The ASAT would provide an independent tribunal 
that would significantly reduce the time of an appeals process, and come 
to a fair and consistent decision based on the totality of the 
circumstances.  Thus, the NFL should take serious consideration of an 
independent arbitral tribunal that would make the process faster, more 
fair, and more consistent. 
 
101. NEW ORLEANS SAINTS PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE/“BOUNTY,” 8 NFL (2012) 
(Tagliabue, Arb.), available at http://sports.cbsimg.net/images/blogs/FinalDecision_Saints_Ap
peal.pdf. 
102. Id. at 13.  Tagliabue noted that previously players had been fined, but not 
suspended for similar conduct.  Id. 
103. Id. at 22. 
104. See id. at 13, 22. 
105. Jesse Reed, Reviewing the Complete Timeline of NFL, Saints Bountygate Scandal, 
BLEACHER REPORT (Dec. 11, 2012), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1441646-reviewing-
the-complete-timeline-of-nfl-saints-bountygate-scandal.  The NFL initially suspended the 
players; the players then filed grievances and appeals and one filed a defamation lawsuit; the 
Commissioner rejected the players’ appeals; the players filed another grievance; the grievance 
arbitration panel found for the players and ordered Commissioner Goodell to look at the case 
again; Goodell recused himself and appointed former-NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue to 
hear the case; and finally, Tagliabue vacated the suspensions (and ended the nightmare).  Id. 
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C. The Basketball Czar: The NBA Commissioner 
The majority of issues in the NBA’s disciplinary process have 
stemmed from the current commissioner, David Stern.106  During his 
tenure as commissioner, Stern has instituted a dress code, suspended 
players for off-court conduct, and fined one organization a quarter-
million dollars for resting its star players for one game during a stretch 
of away games.107  These examples, among others, demonstrate that the 
NBA’s policy for disciplining players and teams is unfair, inconsistent, 
and inflexible. 
The NBA got off to a much slower start than the MLB and NFL, as 
it did not appoint its first commissioner until 1967, and did not give him 
broad authority until 1971.108  Prior to 1971, the League President was 
responsible for player discipline, though he only did so in limited 
circumstances.109  One such situation was in 1953 when the NBA 
President suspended a player indefinitely for gambling.110  In 1967, then-
President Walter Kennedy’s title was changed to Commissioner.111  
Seeing the success of this system in the MLB, in 1971 the owners 
granted the commissioner expansive authority to discipline players in 
the League’s best interests.112  It was under Kennedy that the players 
unionized and negotiated a CBA.113  In 1975, Lawrence O’Brien was 
appointed NBA Commissioner.114  O’Brien contributed to the NBA’s 
merger with the American Basketball Association, but his period as 
 
106. Sam Amick, NBA Global Games are Proud Accomplishment for Stern, USA 
TODAY, Oct. 2, 2013, at C1 (stating that Stern will be stepping down as NBA Commissioner 
on Feb. 1, 2014).  See generally Lockwood, supra note 69, at 150–69 (discussing the changes to 
the NBA Commissioner’s authority while David Stern has held the position). 
107. Lockwood, supra note 69, at 150–52; Sam Borden, Basketball Players’ Night Off 
Makes a Stand for Sitting Out, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2012, at A1.  The players that were rested 
include Tim Duncan, Manu Ginobili, and Tony Parker, who have all played more than ten 
seasons in the NBA, and all with their current team, the San Antonio Spurs.  Id.  The Spurs 
only lost the game by five points despite not playing their three stars and facing the defending 
champion Miami Heat in Miami.  Id. 
108. Lockwood, supra note 69, at 149. 
109. See id. at 147–48. 
110. Id. 
111. Parlow, supra note 2, at 186; Lockwood, supra note 69, at 149. 
112. See Lockwood, supra note 69, at 149; see also Parlow, supra note 2, at 186. 
113. Lockwood, supra note 69, at 149. 
114. Id. at 150. 
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commissioner was mainly notable for economic disputes rather than 
player discipline.115 
David Stern has held the position of NBA Commissioner since his 
appointment in 1984.116  During his tenure, Stern has used the “best 
interest clause” to expand the power of the commissioner much farther 
than his predecessors.117  Stern regulated both on- and off-court conduct, 
including an off-court dress code and an on-court dress code that limited 
accessories players can wear on-court.118  On the court, Stern prohibited 
players from wearing Band-Aids on their faces during games, unless 
medically necessary, to limit self-promotion.119  Additionally, the off-
court dress code requires players to “wear Business Casual attire 
whenever they are engaged in team or league business.”120  Stern has 
used his authority to unilaterally create new rules and occasionally issue 
unprecedented punishments.121  Through the best interest power, Stern 
has also regulated comments that could be viewed as offensive to, or 
critical of, the referees or the League.122  It was under the former 
reasoning that Stern fined Dennis Rodman $50,000, the largest fine of 
an NBA player at that point, for a comment insulting Mormons after a 
 
115. Id.  This merger would secure the NBA as the dominant basketball league by 
absorbing the top four teams of the American Basketball Association, which included such 
prominent players as Julius “Dr. J” Erving.  Id. at 149–50; Encyclopedia Playoff Edition, 
Biography of Julius Erving, NBA.COM, http://www.nba.com/history/players/erving_bio.html 
(last visited Oct. 15, 2013). 
116. Brent D. Showalter, Technical Foul: David Stern’s Excessive Use of Rule-Making 
Authority, 18 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 205, 209 (2007).  Recently, Stern announced he will step 
down as commissioner in February 2014, his thirtieth year holding the position.  Jason Gay, 
Stern Gets Ready for the Buzzer, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 2012, at D10; David Stern to Step 
Down Feb. ‘14, Announces Silver as Successor for NBA Commissioner, SPORTS BUSINESS 
DAILY (Oct. 26, 2012), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Daily/Issues/2012/10/26/Leagues-
and-Governing-Bodies/Stern-retires.aspx.  Despite naming a successor, Stern’s replacement 
will need to be approved by the owners.  Id. 
117. See Parlow, supra note 2, at 186–87; Michael R. Wilson, Why So Stern?: The 
Growing Power of the NBA Commissioner, 7 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 
57–60 (2010). 
118. Showalter, supra note 116, at 210. 
119. Wilson, supra note 117, at 57–58. 
120. Id. at 55–56 (quoting NBA Player Dress Code, NBA.COM (Oct. 20, 2005, 6:42 PM), 
http://www.nba.com/news/player_dress_code_051017.html).  Stern was trying to diminish the 
NBA’s “hip-hop” reputation that he feared was damaging the public’s view of the game.  
Showalter, supra note 116, at 210. 
121. See Wilson, supra note 117, at 57–59. 
122. Id. at 59–60. 
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game in Utah.123  Under the latter reasoning, Stern has repeatedly fined 
Dallas Mavericks owner Mark Cuban for disparaging the referees 
through various media outlets.124 
Commissioner Stern has also been criticized for his inflexible 
approach to discipline under the rule that requires players to stay in “the 
immediate vicinity of their bench” during a fight on the court.125  One 
example of this inflexible approach occurred following the 2007 Western 
Conference Semifinals, where in game four San Antonio Spurs forward 
Robert Horry flagrantly fouled Steve Nash, the star guard of the 
Phoenix Suns and two-time League MVP.126  Two Suns players, 
including star forward Amare Stoudemire, immediately jumped up from 
the bench following the incident.127  While they merely stepped onto the 
court, they were both suspended for one game.128  Meanwhile, Tim 
Duncan, the San Antonio superstar forward, also stepped onto the 
court, but because the altercation occurred closer to the Suns’ bench, he 
was not suspended.129  This situation demonstrates the inconsistency and 
inflexibility of Commissioner Stern’s punishments.  Additionally, under 
the CBA, players may only appeal to the commissioner, who made the 
decision to suspend them.130  Like the NFL and MLB commissioners, 
Commissioner Stern would be in a conflict of interest hearing an appeal 
 
123. Christopher J. McKinny, Comment, Professional Sports Leagues and the First 
Amendment: A Closed Marketplace, 13 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 223, 248–49 (2003).  Rodman 
was punished for saying Mormons were “asshole[s].”  ELLIS CASHMORE, SPORTS CULTURE: 
AN A–Z GUIDE 202 (2000); McKinny, supra, at 248–49. 
124. Wilson, supra note 117, at 59–60. 
125. Three Players Suspended Following Spurs-Suns Incident, NBA.COM (May 15, 2007, 
7:02 PM), http://www.nba.com/news/spurssunssuspension_070515.html (quoting BASKETBAL
L OPERATIONS DEP’T, OFFICIAL RULES OF THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION 20
06–2007, § VII.c (2006), available at http://www.nba.com/media/rule_book _2006-07.pdf); see 
also Jeffrey A. Mishkin, Dispute Resolution in the NBA: The Allocation of Decision Making 
Among the Commissioner, Impartial Arbitrator, System Arbitrator, and the Courts, 35 VAL. U. 
L. REV. 449, 452 (2001). 
126. Three Players Suspended Following Spurs-Suns Incident, supra note 125. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Marc Stein, NBA Suspends Stoudemire, Diaw for Leaving Bench, ESPN.COM (May 
16, 2007, 8:36 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/playoffs2007/news/story?id=2871615. 
130. See Mishkin, supra note 125, at 452.  If the player feels the commissioner abused his 
power in making the decision, then the player can file a grievance against the League, which 
an independent arbitrator would hear. See Lockwood, supra note 69 at 154.  The League’s 
collective bargaining agreement is discussed infra notes 192–201 and accompanying text. 
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to a decision in which he participated.131  This example is another 
illustration of a situation that the ASAT would improve. 
Two other events have shaped the perception of the NBA 
Commissioner and his ultimate authority.  The first was the suspension 
of Latrell Sprewell in the winter of 1997.132  Sprewell was asked to leave 
a practice by his coach, but instead of leaving, Sprewell wrestled the 
coach to the ground and choked him.133  Once separated, Sprewell 
continued to destroy team property and attacked the coach again, 
grazing him with one punch.134  After performing an investigation of the 
incident, Commissioner Stern suspended Sprewell for one full year.135  
However, Sprewell filed a grievance, and the arbitrator selected by the 
NBA and National Basketball Players Association (NBPA) reduced the 
suspension to the remainder of the current season, or from eighty-two to 
only sixty-eight games.136  This situation is an example of how an 
independent arbitration can be effective, but also of the arbitrator’s 
likelihood to find a middle ground of punishment that will leave both 
parties unhappy.137  This problem is likely caused by the fact that either 
side can fire an arbitrator for any reason, and would be solved by the 
proposed ASAT because the tribunal would be independent from both 
parties and require reasons for firing arbitrators.138 
The second event involved a situation similar to the Sprewell 
arbitration.  In 2004 a brawl broke out at a Detroit Pistons game against 
the Indiana Pacers.139  Three Pacers players were suspended for violence 
against fans because the NBA determined that since the conduct 
 
131. Mark Kriegel, In His Twilight, Stern Coming up Small, FOX SPORTS (Dec. 13, 2011, 
11:49 AM), http://msn.foxsports.com/nba/story/nba-david-stern-running-new-orleans-hornets-
rejecting-trades-has-become-incredible-shrinking-commissioner-121211. 
132. See Lockwood, supra note 69, at 152. 
133. Id. at 152–53. 
134. Id. at 153. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. at 154; Parlow, supra note 2, at 195. 
137. In this case the fact that Sprewell’s suspension was reduced is unfathomable; had 
the coach decided to press charges, Sprewell could have easily been arrested for assault and 
battery of his employer.  See Cal. Penal Code §§ 240, 242 (West 2008).  The arbitrator seemed 
to not want to side with either party for fear of a vengeance firing from the other side.  See 
infra note 193 and accompanying text.  See generally Belson, supra note 23 (discussing the 
firing of an experienced arbitrator after an unpopular decision).  If the Sprewell situation was 
not worthy of a full-year suspension, then presumably nothing will be under the current 
system. 
138. See discussion infra Parts III.C, VI. 
139. Lockwood, supra note 69, at 156. 
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occurred during an NBA game, it was necessarily on-court conduct.140  
The NBPA filed a grievance and appealed the suspensions to the 
grievance arbitrator, but the NBA refused to participate because it 
believed the suspensions were not subject to arbitration.141  When the 
arbitrator reduced the players’ suspensions, the NBA sued the NBPA, 
arguing that because the conduct was on-court the arbitrator had no 
jurisdiction.142  However, a New York district court held that because the 
specific conduct did not typically occur during the course of the game, it 
was not on-court conduct and was thus subject to appeal to the 
grievance arbitrator.143  The arbitrator found that Commissioner Stern 
did not have “just cause” to suspend at least one of the players, so the 
suspensions were reduced.144  This fight is yet another example of how 
the current arbitration system in the NBA leaves both parties with 
disappointing results.145 
While the Pacers and the Sprewell situations give the impression that 
the independent arbitration provision in the NBA’s CBA is effective, 
both processes took longer than necessary and produced results that 
were unsatisfactory to both parties involved.146  These examples 
exemplify that players have little protection from inconsistent rulings 
under the current disciplinary structure.  Commissioner Stern has also 
demonstrated remarkable inflexibility in determining discipline.147  This 
system could be improved by allowing an independent tribunal to hear a 
greater number of disciplinary inquiries, which would increase the 
fairness, consistency, and flexibility of the process. 
 
140. Sirotkin, supra note 2, at 306–07. 
141. Id. 
142. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Nat’l Basketball Players Ass’n, No. 04 Civ. 9528(GBD), 
2005 WL 22869, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
143. Id. at *11. 
144. Lockwood, supra note 69, at 157–58. 
145. See id.  This incident was a severe black-eye on the NBA and clearly a situation 
where the commissioner should have been able to suspend players under the best interest 
clause.  See Artest, Jackson Charge Palace Stands, ESPN.COM (Nov. 21, 2004, 2:57 AM), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=1927380. 
146. See Lockwood, supra note 69, at 155–56. 
147. See supra notes 118–29 and accompanying text. 
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D. The Most Recent Development: The NHL Commissioner 
Until 1992, the most powerful position in the NHL League office 
was the President.148  In order to lure Gary Bettman, then the General 
Counsel of the NBA, away from the NBA the owners offered him a new 
position: NHL Commissioner.149  This position expanded the authority of 
the President to include a similar power to the commissioners of other 
professional sports leagues.150  Over the course of his tenure, the NHL 
has endured three lockouts and, in an attempt to increase public interest 
in the game, instituted various rule changes.151  In addition to recent 
inconsistent discipline,152 Bettman has also resorted to an exceptional 
suspension in multiple cases involving extreme on-ice misconduct, 
punishing four players for “the rest of the season.”153  These four 
incidents involved: one player sucker-punching another in the back of 
the head; one player striking another player in the face with his stick; 
one player using his stick to strike another player in the side of the head; 
and one player elbowing another in the head.154  By disciplining all four 
players for “the rest of the season,” Commissioner Bettman avoided 
setting a precedent for similar conduct.  Additionally, despite the fact 
that the commissioner has the authority to discipline for off-ice conduct, 
he chose not to discipline Dany Heatley when Heatley was arrested for 
reckless driving and charged with vehicular homicide for driving over 
 
148. Thomas J. Arkell, National Hockey League Jurisprudence: Past, Present and Future, 
8 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 135, 136 (1998). 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. Gary Bettman, SPORTS E-CYCLOPEDIA (Feb. 12, 2013, 11:30 PM), 
http://www.sportsecyclopedia.com/nhl/comish/bettman.html.  These rule changes included an 
impromptu rule interpretation change during the 1999 Stanley Cup finals in which during the 
third overtime Dallas Stars forward Brett Hull scored a goal with a skate in the crease, which 
had previously been characterized as a situation where a goal would be disallowed, but the 
referees allowed the goal and the Stars won the Stanley Cup over the Buffalo Sabres.  
Controversy Continues, CNNSI.COM (June 22, 1999, 8:11 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.co
m/hockey/nhl/1999/playoffs/news/1999/06/20/sabres_bitter/.  After the game, NHL officials 
upheld the goal despite a goal crease rule that had been enforced under a no-tolerance policy 
throughout the season.  Id.  The Sabres have never returned to the Stanley Cup finals.  
Stanley Cup Champions and Finalists, NHL.COM, http://www.nhl.com/ice/page.htm?id=25426 
(last visited Dec. 31, 2013). 
152. See supra notes 5–15 and accompanying text. 
153. Jamie Fitzpatrick, The Longest NHL Suspensions, ABOUT, http://proicehockey. 
about.com/cs/history/a/nhl_suspensions.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2013).  The longest was for 
twenty-five games and the shortest for ten games.  Id. 
154. Id. 
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eighty miles-per-hour in a thirty-five miles-per-hour zone and crashing 
his Ferrari, which resulted in the death of his teammate and friend.155  
This same conduct would likely have been suspension-worthy in any of 
the other three leagues.156 
While the advent of the commissioner has undoubtedly helped the 
four major American professional sports leagues develop and thrive in 
the last century,157 the disciplinary structure outlined by each league’s 
CBA has left much to be desired for both leagues and players.158  In each 
league, the commissioner has seemingly unbeatable power to distribute 
discipline at his discretion without regard to any system of precedence 
or an explicitly defined code.159  He is limited only by vague provisions in 
the league’s CBA or league constitution.160  The commissioner system 
has been so economically successful that it would make little sense to 
completely abolish it, but establishing an independent arbitral tribunal 
to hear appeals would make the system more fair and consistent.161  This 
new structure would alleviate the commissioners of appeal 
responsibilities while retaining the commissioners’ power to discipline.  
Instead, this new body would establish a system of precedent to increase 
the integrity of the leagues and remove much of the public criticism of 
commissioners that arises when commissioners hear appeals to their 
own disciplinary decisions.162  The ASAT would thus achieve the best of 
 
155. Ray Glier, Heatley Sentenced to 3 Years’ Probation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2005, at 
D5. 
156. See, e.g., Benjamin Hochman, Nuggets’ Smith Suspended 7 Games, DENVER POST 
(Aug. 28, 2009, 2:53 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/nuggets/ci_13223490#ixzz0ejFsIlVu 
(noting that the NBA suspended J.R. Smith for a reckless driving accident resulting in the 
death of his friend); Ex-O’s Hurler Ponson Gets Five Days for DWI, ESPN.COM, Dec. 12, 
2005, http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=2256427 (explaining that MLB’s Sidney 
Ponson’s contract was terminated by the team one week after Ponson was convicted of 
driving while impaired); Little Charged with Felony DUI, Speeding, ESPN.COM, Apr. 27, 
2004, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=1790240 (noting that the NFL suspended 
Leonard Little for the first half of the 1999 season without pay after he pled guilty to 
involuntary manslaughter for a traffic accident). 
157. Gregor Lentze, The Legal Concept of Professional Sports Leagues: The 
Commissioner and an Alternative Approach from a Corporate Perspective, 6 MARQ. SPORTS 
L.J. 65, 67 (1995). 
158. See Sirotkin, supra note 2, at 304–09; Belson, supra note 23; Heimlich, supra note 
15. 
159. See Sirotkin, supra note 2, at 291, 299–302. 
160. Id. at 292–98. 
161. See Lentze, supra note 157, at 67. 
162. See, e.g., Mishkin, supra note 125, at 452; Reece, supra note 66, at 361; Sirotkin, 
supra note 2, at 291, 300–01. 
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both worlds by maintaining the power of the commissioner to act in the 
best interests of the league while curtailing negative publicity and 
increasing public trust in the system and the sport. 
III. CURRENT GOVERNING DOCUMENTS 
Each of the professional American sports leagues are governed by 
various documents, including constitutions, league bylaws, and most 
importantly, CBAs.163  The CBA for each league establishes the 
procedures and scope of the disciplinary system.164  This Part will explore 
the arbitration provisions in the governing documents of the MLB, NFL, 
NBA, and NHL.  It will also assess what aspects are effective and can be 
incorporated into the ASAT, as well as those that are ineffective and 
how they should be changed by the ASAT. 
A. The MLB’s Governing Documents 
The MLB has three different systems of arbitration: one for salary 
disputes, one for on-field discipline, and one for all other grievances.165  
Salary arbitration will not be discussed in this Comment because it is a 
completely separate system that does not involve player discipline.166  
For appeals of discipline stemming from on-field conduct or “conduct 
that is materially detrimental or materially prejudicial to the best 
interest of Baseball,” players participate in a hearing in front of the 
Executive Vice President, Administration, or the MLB Commissioner.167  
 
163.  ROGER I. ABRAMS, SPORTS JUSTICE: THE LAW & THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS 90 
(2010); MATTHEW J. MITTEN, SPORTS LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 49 (Roger Blanpain et 
al. eds., Wolters Kluwer 2011). 
164. Jan Stiglitz, Player Discipline in Team Sports, 5 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 167, 168 (1995), 
reprinted in SPORTS LAW & REGULATION 129, 131 (Joseph Gordon Hylton & Paul M. 
Anderson eds., 1999). 
165. MLB CBA, supra note 54, at art. VI, § E, arts. XI, XII. 
166. See generally id. at art. VI, § E (providing the procedures and rules regarding salary 
arbitration of MLB players). 
167. Id. at art. XII, § A–B, art. XI, § C(1)(a)–(b).  These hearings usually arise from 
suspensions due to a fight on the field, touching an umpire, or a pitcher intentionally hitting a 
batter.  See MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, 2012 EDITION OFFICIAL BASEBALL RULES R. 9.05 
(2012), available at http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/downloads/y2012/Official_Baseball_Rules.pdf; 
e.g., Matt Snyder, Devin Mesoraco Likely Faces Suspension After Making Contact with 
Umpire, CBSSPORTS.COM (July 30, 2012, 8:55 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/mlb/blog/eye-
on-baseball/19691226/devin-mesoraco-likely-faces-suspension-after-making-contact-with-
umpire; Todd Zolecki, Hamels Suspended 5 Games for Hitting Harper, MLB.COM (May 8, 
2012, 4:27 PM), http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20120507&content_id=30648282&v
key=news_mlb&c_id=mlb; Suspensions Doled Out for MLB Brawl, USA TODAY, June 19, 
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In these cases, players are given the right to all evidence the League uses 
in an investigation regarding that player’s discipline and can challenge 
the just cause for their punishment.168  Additionally, the best interests 
clause can be found in the MLB Constitution, establishing that the 
commissioner may investigate and punish anything he believes is “not in 
the best interests of the national game of Baseball.”169  The ASAT would 
not alter the first step in these punishments; the League CBA would still 
govern player discipline and allow the commissioner, or a representative 
of the commissioner’s office, to impose penalties on players for on- and 
off-field conduct.  The ASAT would incorporate the MLB’s approach to 
appealing discipline by providing all evidence the league used in the 
investigation, but the challenge hearing would be conducted by ASAT 
instead of by the League.170 
The arbitration system for all other grievances under the CBA takes 
much more time to resolve because they are conducted by the 
arbitration panel,171 which is composed of two-party arbitrators (one 
appointed by the League and one by the Players’ Association) and one 
“impartial” arbitrator.172  This impartial arbitrator must be agreed upon 
by the League and the Association, otherwise the American Arbitration 
Association (AAA) submits a list of potential arbitrators that the 
League and Association must narrow down to one.173  These impartial 
arbitrators can be fired at any time, for any reason, by either the League 
or the Association, so long as they are not currently handling a case.174  
Decisions by the panels may not create precedent and are final and 
binding.175  None of these policies would be incorporated into the 
ASAT; in fact, the ASAT would use essentially the opposite of these 
provisions.176 
 
2007, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/2007-06-18-brawl-suspensions_N.htm. 
168. MLB CBA, supra note 54, at art. XII, § D. 
169. MAJOR LEAGUE CONST. art. II, §§ 2–3 (2008), available at http://bizofbaseball.com/ 
docs/MLConsititutionJune2005Update.pdf. 
170. MLB CBA, supra note 54, at art. XII, § D. 
171. Id. at art. XI, § B.  These grievances include suspensions under the drug policy as 
well as all other non-disciplinary grievances allowable in the CBA.  Id. at art. XI, § A(1). 
172. Id. at art. XI, § A(9). 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at art. XI, § B. 
176. Further discussion of the ASAT specific policies and proposed provisions can be 
found infra Part V. 
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B. The NFL’s Governing Documents 
The NFL employs three types of arbitrators that each rule on 
different conflicts: an impartial arbitrator, a notice arbitrator, and a 
system arbitrator.177  However, player discipline doled out by the NFL 
Commissioner is not included in any of the provisions that fall under any 
of these arbitrators’ jurisdiction.178  Instead, the commissioner assigns a 
League officer representative to hear a player’s appeal.179  His power to 
hear these appeals is found in the NFL Constitution.180  Additionally, his 
disciplinary powers include the power to punish any “conduct 
detrimental to the best interests of the League or professional 
football.”181  These appeals are heard between eight to thirteen days 
from the player’s filing for appeal of punishment.182  The CBA provides 
for a minimum fine for each year and, before the beginning of the 
season, the league and the NFLPA agree on a schedule of fines.183  Still, 
the league may increase fines or suspensions “[w]here circumstances 
warrant,” including where infractions were “flagrant and gratuitous.”184  
 
177. NFL CBA, supra note 72, at arts. 15, 16, 43.  The impartial arbitrator has authority 
to rule over decisions involving free agency, rookie compensation, the draft, some salary cap 
concerns, and most non-injury issues.  Id. at arts. 6, 8–10, 13, 21, 23, 26.  The system arbitrator 
is responsible for all other issues.  Id. at arts. 1, 4, 6–19, 26–28, 31, 68–70.  The league and the 
players association agreed on a notice arbitrator, who is responsible for selecting the four 
non-injury grievance or impartial arbitrators.  Id. at art. 43, § 6.  The most senior non-injury 
grievance arbitrator is next in line for the position of notice arbitrator.  Id.  These arbitrators 
can also be fired by either side for any reason, but only during a ten-day window in July.  Id. 
178. Id. at art. 46. 
179. Id. at art 46, § 2(a).  The commissioner can elect to hear the appeal himself at his 
discretion.  Id.  Since the league office has handed down the punishment, this in essence 
allows the same party to be the police, prosecution, judge, and jury. 
180. CONST. AND BYLAWS OF THE NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE art. VIII, § 8.3 (2006), 
available at http://static.nfl.com/static/content/public/static/html/careers/pdf/co_.pdf. 
181. Id. at art. VIII, § 8.3(E). 
182. NFL CBA, supra note 72, at art 46, § 2(i). 
183. Id. at art. 46, § 1(d). 
184. Id.  Unfortunately, the CBA does not articulate what these terms mean.  See id.  
Various players believe the league is “out to get them” and for some it is with good reason.  
Ashley Dunkak, Carolina Safety Mike Mitchell Takes Thinly Veiled Shot at Ndamukong Suh, 
CBS DETROIT (Oct. 28, 2013, 5:04 PM), http://detroit.cbslocal.com/2013/10/28/carolina-
safety-mike-mitchell-takes-thinly-veiled-shot-at-ndamukong-suh/; Michael David Smith, 
Merton Hanks: I Fined Ndamukong Suh to Get His Attention, NBC SPORTS (Oct. 19, 2013, 
7:40 AM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2013/10/19/merton-hanks-i-fined-ndamukong-
suh-to-get-his-attention/.  The league does not help its cause by keeping the CBA terms vague 
because questions of subjectivity are inevitable.  Additionally, many, including Redskins 
Head Coach Mike Shanahan, would like to see the procedure change so that the appeals are 
conducted in a more timely manner and players would miss less time while the League makes 
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Additionally, players can be punished by the league for violating the 
PCP, which outlines the types of behavior the commissioner finds 
detrimental to the league.185  On the other hand, the league can only 
reduce a fine “if it exceeds 25 percent of one week of a player’s salary 
for a first offense, and 50 percent of one week of a player’s salary for a 
second offense,” or if the player argues that the circumstances do not 
warrant the scheduled fine.186  These fines do not contribute to the 
League workers’ salary, instead half of the fines go to the players’ 
assistance trust and the remaining half are donated to a charity on which 
the NFL and NFLPA agree.187 
While the appeals from player discipline are not currently delegated 
to an arbitrator under the NFL’s CBA, these appeals would be handled 
by the ASAT.188  The NFL does a commendable job of attempting 
expeditious hearings, and a similar provision would be in place in the 
ASAT to ensure players would not miss unnecessary time or play when 
they should be suspended.189  If the athlete receiving discipline decides to 
appeal, the League would also have to provide any evidence used and 
give reasoning for the fine or suspension if it differed from punishments 
set forth in the CBA.  One aspect of the NFL CBA that would most 
certainly be imitated is the distribution of player fines, which would go 
to one of a list of charities.190  Also, while the NFL provides a policy for 
increasing fines according to a particular schedule, it should provide 
more detail as to what conduct is “flagrant and gratuitous,” as it would 
have to prove the extent of such conduct to the ASAT panel.191 
C. The NBA’s Governing Documents 
Unlike the NFL and MLB, the NBA uses only two arbitrators: a 
grievance arbitrator and a system arbitrator.192  The grievance arbitrator 
 
its decision.  John Keim, Coach: Appeal Process Needs Change, ESPN (Oct. 25, 2013, 2:54 
PM), http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/9877119/mike-shanahan-coach-washington-redskins-
thinks-appeal-process-change. 
185. NFL PCP, supra note 78. 
186. NFL CBA, supra note 72, at art. 46, § 1(d). 
187. Id. at art. 46, § 5(c). 
188. Id. at art. 46, § 2(a). 
189. Id. at art. 46, § 2(i). 
190. Id. 
191. Id. at art. 46, § 1(d). 
192. NAT’L BASKETBALL ASS’N & NAT’L BASKETBALL PLAYERS ASS’N., NBA 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT arts. XXXI & XXXII (2011) [hereinafter NBA 
CBA], available at http://www.nbpa.org/cba/2011.  The system arbitrator handles mostly 
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is scheduled to serve for the length of the CBA, but can be terminated 
by either party during a six-day window each summer.193  The grievance 
arbitrator is responsible for handling disciplinary disputes, but only 
those disputes arising from a fine of at least fifty-thousand dollars or a 
suspension of at least twelve games, anything less can only be appealed 
to the commissioner.194  For these smaller appeals, the commissioner has 
the authority to affirm or reduce the fine or suspension, but cannot 
increase it.195  For the larger appeals, the grievance arbitrator must use 
an “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review of the commissioner’s 
decision.196  Like the NFL, the NBA has a list of some of the off-court 
conduct that will result in punishment and a schedule of fines, but it is 
not very specific.197  Additionally, hearings cannot take place 
immediately, or even quickly, because each side is guaranteed thirty 
days’ notice.198  In preparation for the hearings, the parties must submit a 
joint statement of the issue and are required to present all relevant 
evidence to the other side at least a week in advance of the hearing.199  
The arbitrator is granted broad authority to make decisions related to 
smaller issues, such as procedural matters and jurisdiction, and his or 
her decision is final and binding.200 
The NBA uses a structure that only allows for an arbitrator to rule 
on the most serious penalties while handling smaller penalties in-
house,201 a system the ASAT would alter.202  Further, while the NBA 
provides a schedule for fines and suspensions,203 it would have to be 
more fully developed to include more specific conduct so the arbitrators 
could avoid having to interpret ambiguous CBA provisions.  The 
schedule for hearings would also be changed to be more efficient, while 
 
monetary disputes, including those related to free agency.  Id. at art. XXXII, § 1. 
193. Id. at art. XXXI, § 7(a).  If the arbitrator is fired and the league and the players 
association cannot agree on the next arbitrator, the International Institute for Conflict 
Prevention and Resolution submits a list of eleven lawyers that the parties can choose from to 
be the next grievance arbitrator.  Id. at art. XXXI, § 7(b). 
194. Id. at art. XXXI, § 9(a). 
195. Id. at art. XXXI, § 9(a)(4). 
196. Id. at art. XXXI, § 9(b). 
197. See id. at art. VI. 
198. Id. at art. XXXI, § 4(a). 
199. Id. at art. XXXI, § 5(a)–(b). 
200. Id. at art. XXXI, § 6. 
201. Id. at art. XXXI, § 9(a). 
202. Further discussion of this system infra Part V.A. 
203. NBA CBA, supra note 192, at art. XXXI, § 9. 
34609-m
qt_97-2 Sheet No. 147 Side B      03/17/2014   11:30:34
34609-mqt_97-2 Sheet No. 147 Side B      03/17/2014   11:30:34
C M
Y K
ABRAMS-10 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/10/2014  12:33 PM 
500 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:2 
maintaining effectiveness, and the arbitrators would have similar 
authority to rule on smaller issues, such as arbitrability and procedural 
issues.  These arbitrators would also have similar security throughout 
the year, except that in order to be fired, a party must provide just cause 
for termination, as opposed to firing for any reason.204 
D. The NHL’s Governing Documents 
Similar to the MLB and NFL, the NHL and the National Hockey 
League Players’ Association (NHLPA) appoint an impartial arbitrator 
to serve for the duration of the CBA.205  Either party may dismiss this 
impartial arbitrator each year by giving the arbitrator written notice on 
or before September 1.206  The NHL CBA allows the commissioner to 
discipline players for both on-ice and off-ice conduct.207  For the on-ice 
discipline, the commissioner, or his designee, may impose a fine or 
suspension on a player for “the use of excessive and unnecessary force 
and reckless acts resulting in injury.”208  By including “resulting in 
injury,” the NHL distinguishes itself greatly from the NFL, NBA, and 
MLB.209  In determining the punishment, the League office considers the 
player’s intent, the specific conduct, any resulting injuries, past offenses, 
and game situations.210  For suspensions up to five games or fines over 
five-thousand dollars, the player has the right to a telephonic hearing 
with the League, which is held as soon as reasonably possible.211  If a 
player decides to appeal the League’s disciplinary decision, the 
commissioner decides whether another hearing (either telephonic or in-
 
204. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
205. NAT’L HOCKEY LEAGUE & NAT’L HOCKEY LEAGUE PLAYER’S ASS’N, 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE AND 
NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE PLAYERS’ ASSOCIATION: SEPTEMBER 16, 2012–SEPTEMBER 
15, 2022 art. 17, § 6 (2012) [hereinafter NHL CBA], available at http://www.nhl.com/nhl/en/v3/
ext/CBA2012/NHL_NHLPA_2013_CBA.pdf.  The impartial arbitrator must be a member of 
the National Academy of Arbitrators.  Id. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. at arts. 18, 18-A. 
208. Id. at art. 18, §§ 1–2. 
209. Id. at art. 18, § 2.  This factor creates considerable confusion and the appearance of 
subjectivity in discipline because the league has given it great weight in decision-making, 
perhaps more so than the player’s intent.  See supra notes 5–15 and accompanying text. 
210. NHL CBA, supra note 205, at art. 18, § 2.  For instance, a particularly hard hit in a 
close game may not result in a suspension where it might if the game is lopsided.  Id. 
211. Id. at art. 18, §§ 4(b)(i), 8(a).  The league is also required to give the NHLPA any 
evidence it plans to use prior to the hearing.  Id. at art. 18, § 4(b)(ii). 
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person) is necessary.212  If the commissioner hears the appeal, he 
determines if the League’s decision "was supported by clear and 
convincing evidence.”213  In these appeals, the commissioner’s ultimate 
disciplinary decision is final and binding.214  Like the other leagues, the 
NHL Constitution also grants the commissioner the authority to hear 
disputes and issue discipline.215 
For suspensions of six games or more, players have a right to an in-
person hearing with a League representative.216  If a player elects to 
appeal that decision, the commissioner must conduct an in-person 
hearing with the player using the same “clear and convincing” 
standard.217  For these more serious suspensions, the player may appeal 
the commissioner’s decision to a Neutral Discipline Arbitrator (NDA), 
who will conduct a third in-person hearing to determine whether the 
suspension was supported by “substantial evidence.”218  Like the 
impartial arbitrator, the NDA is appointed to serve for the duration of 
the term but may be discharged each year by either party upon notice 
on or before July 1.219  If a hearing is necessary after dismissing one 
NDA but before replacing her, the impartial arbitrator conducts the 
hearing.220 
The commissioner also has the power to discipline players for 
violation of off-ice League rules or conduct “that is detrimental to or 
against the welfare of the League or the game of hockey,” similar to the 
other leagues’ best interests clauses.221  Under the CBA, the 
commissioner can suspend or expel a player, fine a player, or cancel a 
player’s contract.222  Under this provision, the commissioner must 
 
212. Id. at art. 18, § 12. 
213. Id. 
214. Id. 
215. CONST. OF THE NAT’L HOCKEY LEAGUE, art. VI, § 6.3(b), (j), available at 
http://www.bizofhockey.com/docs/NHLConsitution.pdf. 
216. NHL CBA, supra note 205, at art. 18, § 9. 
217. Id. at art. 18, § 12. 
218. Id. at art. 18, § 13(c).  The NDA’s decision is final and binding.  Id.  During this 
entire process, the player is prevented from playing in a game, at least up to the length of the 
suspension.  Id. at art. 18, § 13(b). 
219. Id. at art. 18, § 14(a).  The NDA is supposed to have “substantial experience as an 
arbitrator or judge,” but no sports familiarity is required.  Id. at art. 18, § 14(c).  In fact, the 
other prerequisite is the ability to be in Toronto or New York for the potential hearings.  Id. 
220. Id. at art. 18, § 14(d). 
221. Id. at art. 18-A, § 2. 
222. Id. at art. 18-A, § 2(a)–(c).  While cancelling a contract is very unlikely, 
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conduct a hearing, the result of which can be appealed to the impartial 
arbitrator.223  The impartial arbitrator considers the surrounding 
circumstances, the proportionality of the penalty to the offense, and the 
interests of both the League and player in determining whether the 
punishment is supported by substantial evidence and is not 
unreasonable.224 
While certain provisions of the MLB, NFL, NBA, and NHL CBAs 
could be incorporated into an effective and efficient arbitral body, most 
provisions would run counter to the goal of the ASAT.  The proposed 
arbitral tribunal would not alter the current immediate disciplinary 
provisions of the CBAs; it would only affect the appeals procedures, as 
will be discussed in Part VI.  Thus, the leagues could still collectively 
bargain for disciplinary procedures, conduct that will result in 
punishment, and the types of penalties that can be imposed; the ASAT 
would make sure that the leagues abide by these agreements.225 
IV. EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS 
Throughout the world numerous international sports courts and 
professional sports leagues have developed their own systems of 
discipline.  Three that have been particularly successful and contain 
elements that could be successfully incorporated in American 
professional sports are the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), the 
Basketball Arbitral Tribunal (BAT), and Australia’s National Rugby 
League (NRL).226  These three systems do not use a commissioner 
 
Commissioner Bettman cancelled a contract between Ilya Kovalchuk and the New Jersey 
Devils because he believed the parties were attempting to circumvent the League salary cap.  
Tarik El-Bashir, NHL Fights Back in Contract Battle, WASH. POST, July 22, 2010, at D6.  The 
parties eventually restructured the deal, which the NHL accepted, but Kovalchuk 
unexpectedly retired in the summer 2013; leaving $77 million of the total $100 million on the 
table and returning to Russia to play in the Russian Hockey League instead.  Kevin Allen, 
Ilya Kovalchuk Says He’s Retiring from NHL, USA TODAY (July 12, 2013, 1:17 AM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nhl/devils/2013/07/11/ilya-kovalchuk-announces-
retirement-new-jersey-devils/2509857/. 
223. NHL CBA, supra note 205, at art. 18-A, §§ 3(d), 4. 
224. Id. at art. 18-A, § 4. 
225. See MLB CBA, supra note 54, at arts. XI–XII; NBA CBA, supra note 192, at arts. 
VI, XXXI; NFL CBA, supra note 72, at art. 46; NHL CBA, supra note 205, at arts. 17, 18, 18-
A. 
226. See MITTEN ET AL., supra note 22, at 321; Ian Dobinson & David Thorpe, What’s 
Wrong With the Commissioner? Some Lessons from Downunder, 19 SETON HALL J. SPORTS 
& ENT. L. 105, 110–11 (2009); Dirk-Reiner Martens, Basketball Arbitral Tribunal, 
INNOVATING JUSTICE, http://www.innovatingjustice.com/innovations/Basketball-Arbitral-
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structure and have alternative arrangements that this Part will explore.  
Much like Part III, this Part will assess the effectiveness of each aspect 
of these systems and determine whether they can, and should, be 
incorporated into the proposed ASAT.  By integrating the effective 
features from various different structures, the ASAT would balance the 
challenges faced by the individual systems and ultimately create what 
could be the most fair and consistent disciplinary structure in the world 
of sports. 
A. The World’s Largest International Sports Court: CAS 
The CAS is located in Lausanne, Switzerland227 and resolves various 
international sport disputes, including disputes involving athletes in 
Olympic sports, international football, and any other sport disciplinary 
cases that involve athletes with a CAS arbitration provision in their 
contracts.228  The International Council of Arbitration for Sport (ICAS) 
is a group of twenty members that creates and amends the code that 
governs CAS.229  ICAS members are elected to renewable four-year 
periods by the International Sports Federations, National Olympic 
Committees, and the International Olympic Committee.230  The ICAS is 
responsible for appointing and removing CAS arbitrators and supervises 
the CAS Court Office.231 
The CAS maintains more than 150 arbitrators with legal training and 
sports backgrounds.232  These arbitrators are listed publicly,233 and are 
expected to perform their duties objectively and independently.234  While 
CAS decisions are publicly available if all parties agree, the arbitrators 
are bound by a duty of confidentiality.235  The applicable division of CAS 
 
Tribunal (last visited Feb. 11, 2013). 
227. COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORTS, Statutes of the Bodies Working for the 
Settlement of Sports-Related Disputes, in TAS/CAS CODE § 1 (2013) [hereinafter CAS 
STATUTES], available at http://www.tas-cas.org/d2wfiles/document/4962/5048/0/Code2020132 
0corrections20finales20(en).pdf. 
228. History of the CAS: Types of Disputes Submitted to the CAS, TAS/CAS, 
http://www.tas-cas.org/en/infogenerales.asp/4-3-239-1011-4-1-1/5-0-1011-3-0-0/ (last visited 
Jan. 13, 2013). 
229. CAS STATUTES, supra note 227, §§ 2, 4, 6. 
230. Id. §§ 4–5. 
231. Id. § 6.3, .7. 
232. Id. §§ 13–14. 
233. Id. § 15. 
234. Id. § 18. 
235. COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORTS, Procedural Rules, in TAS/CAS CODE R. 43 
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for American sports leagues is the Appeals Arbitration Division, which 
resolves disputes between athletes and federations, associations, or 
other sports bodies.236  All arbitrators can be challenged within a week of 
the party finding grounds for a challenge, such as subjectivity or 
previous relationship between the arbitrator and the other party.237 
The CAS arbitrators have the authority to determine if the case is 
within CAS jurisdiction, so no outside court assistance is necessary.238  A 
panel contains three arbitrators, unless otherwise determined by the 
organization’s document containing the CAS arbitration provision.239  
Usually, both the claimant and respondent select a single arbitrator, and 
those two arbitrators select the third; however, unlike the MLB system, 
all three arbitrators must be impartial.240  The panel has the authority to 
require either party to produce any documents or other evidence that it 
believes is likely to exist and is relevant.241  The parties can either elect 
that the panel apply general principles of fairness and justice or request 
that the panel apply the laws of a particular jurisdiction.242  When an 
organization disciplines an athlete, that athlete has three weeks to file an 
appeal, unless another time limit exists in the organization’s governing 
documents.243  The CAS can affirm a Federation’s decision, make a new 
decision that replaces it, or annul it and refer the case back to the 
Federation.244  Whatever the result, all CAS decisions are final and 
binding on the parties.245 
 
(2013) [hereinafter CAS PROCEDURAL RULES], available at http://www.tas-cas.org/d2wfiles/ 
document/4962/5048/0/Code20201320corrections20finales20(en).pdf; CAS STATUTES, supra 
note 227, § 19. 
236. CAS STATUTES, supra note 227, § 20.b. 
237. Id. § 34. 
238. CAS PROCEDURAL RULES, supra note 235, at R. 39.  The claimant is required to 
pay 1,000 Swiss francs for the CAS to hear the case.  Id. at R. 64.1.  The panel would then 
determine an estimate cost of the proceeding that must be paid in advance.  Id. at R. 64.2.  It 
can also award reasonable attorney’s fees.  Id. at R. 64.1. 
239. Id. at R. 50. 
240. Compare id. at R. 40.2, with MLB CBA, supra note 54, at art. XI, § A(9). 
241. CAS PROCEDURAL RULES, supra note 235, at R. 44.3. 
242. Id. at R. 45, 58. 
243. Id. at R. 49. 
244. Id. at R. 57. 
245. Id. at R. 46.  The only recourse one can have from a CAS decision is an appeal to 
the Swiss Federal Tribunal (SFT) because the seat of CAS is in Lausanne, Switzerland.  Id. at 
R. 47; Matthew J. Mitten & Timothy Davis, Athlete Eligibility Requirements and Legal 
Protection of Sports Participation Opportunities, 8 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 71, 80 (2008).  The 
SFT will only review cases on very limited grounds: erroneous jurisdiction; failure to rule on 
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While the ASAT would solely involve disputes involving leagues 
from North America, like the CAS it would involve athletes from across 
the globe who speak many different languages.246  As will be discussed in 
the next Part, the ASAT would likely incorporate many of the CAS’s 
policies because it is to date the largest and most prominent arbitral 
tribunal specifically dedicated to sports-related issues, and, like the goal 
of ASAT, it only hears appeals.247 
B. The Newest International Sports Court: BAT 
The International Basketball Federation recently established an 
independent arbitral tribunal specifically for basketball.248  The BAT, 
like CAS, was established in Switzerland.249  BAT arbitrations are 
conducted before a single arbitrator, who is appointed by the BAT 
President on a rotational basis.250  The arbitrator has the authority to 
rule on jurisdiction issues as well as to stop the proceedings if he or she 
believes the arbitration rules are not the appropriate realm to resolve 
the dispute.251  This arbitrator can be challenged if there are legitimate 
doubts about his or her independence; such a challenge must be brought 
“within seven days after the ground for the challenge” becomes known 
to the BAT President.252 
 
claim; ruling on unclaimed issues; and irregular panel formation.  Id. at 86. 
246. See History of the CAS: Origins, TAS/CAS, http://www.tas-
cas.org/en/infogenerales.asp/4-3-234-1011-4-1-1/5-0-1011-3-0-0/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2013).  
The need for an internationally conscious system is apparent with the increase of foreign 
players in the North American leagues.  See Percentage of Foreign Players Rises, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 5, 2012, available at NewsBank, Rec. No. D9TV1DV81; Joel 
Millman, These Days, Everybody’s All-American Just May Be a Haitian, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 4, 
2009, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB125987130978175269; NHL Nationalit
y Breakdown from 1917–18 to 2013–14, QUANTHOCKEY.COM, http://www.quanthockey.com 
/TS/TS_PlayerNationalities.php (last visited Feb. 7, 2013); Record-Tying 84 International 
Players on Opening-Night Rosters, NBA.COM (Oct. 31, 2012, 1:20 AM), http://www.nba.com 
/2012/news/10/30/international-players-on-opening-night-rosters/index.html. 
247. See MITTEN ET AL., supra note 22, at 321. 
248. INTERNATIONAL BASKETBALL FEDERATION, FIBA INTERNAL REGULATIONS, 
bk. 3, ch. VII, § 289 (2010). 
249. CAS STATUTES, supra note 227, § 1; INTERNATIONAL BASKETBALL FEDERATION, 
supra note 248, at bk. 3, ch. VII, § 295. 
250. BASKETBALL ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL, ARBITRATION RULES, R. 8.1 (2012) 
[hereinafter BAT RULES], available at http://www.fiba.com/downloads/v3_expe/bat/BATArbi
trationRules1May2012.PDF. 
251. Id. at R. 1.2–1.3. 
252. Id. at R. 8.3. 
34609-m
qt_97-2 Sheet No. 150 Side B      03/17/2014   11:30:34
34609-mqt_97-2 Sheet No. 150 Side B      03/17/2014   11:30:34
C M
Y K
ABRAMS-10 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/10/2014  12:33 PM 
506 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:2 
To start a proceeding, a party must submit a complaint that contains 
“[a]ll  written evidence on which the Claimant intends to rely.”253  The 
defendant is required to answer, but any additional filings will be 
ignored unless the arbitrator requests them.254  Each hearing requires a 
nominal fee depending on the value of the case that is no less than 1,500 
euro, but no more than 7,000 euro.255  The arbitration can proceed only if 
both parties agree in writing to arbitrate the dispute, typically through 
an arbitration clause in the player’s contract.256  A quirk to this system is 
that arbitrators can promote a settlement between the parties instead of 
the typical arbitration ruling.257  Arbitrators are not required to follow 
any particular set of governing documents, but instead make rulings on 
the general principles of fairness and justice, unless otherwise stipulated 
in the contract between the two parties.258  Within six weeks of the 
hearing, the arbitrator must file an award, which is public unless 
otherwise mandated by the arbitrator or the BAT President.259  The 
result of this award determines what party is responsible for paying 
arbitration costs and the proportions of those costs.260 
This system was established to provide an effective, efficient, and 
simple method of resolving disputes in the world of international 
professional basketball.261  While some aspects of this structure are 
unrealistic to bring to the U.S., like the single arbitrator and the lack of 
a code, there are other aspects that would make sense for American 
professional sports leagues, such as, having the arbitrators selected by an 
independent body and having them determine issues of jurisdiction, 
evidence, and procedure.262  These aspects could help to make the 
system of discipline in American professional sports faster, more fair, 
and more consistent. 
 
253. Id. at R. 9.1. 
254. Id. at R. 11.2, 12.1. 
255. Id. at R. 17.1. 
256. Id. at R. 1.1. 
257. Id. at R. 12.3. 
258. Id. at R. 15.1. 
259. Id. at R. 16.3–.4. 
260. Id. at R. 17.3. 
261. Id. at R. 0.2–.3. 
262. See id. at R. 0.1, 1.2–.3, 3.1, 8.1, 12.1–.2, 15.1. 
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C. Another National Professional League: Australia’s NRL 
Australia’s NRL is now governed by a system that includes a “Code 
of Conduct, Anti-Doping Rules, Anti-Vilification Code, Judiciary Code 
of Procedure and Appeals Committee Procedural Rules.”263  Under 
these rules, the discipline for on-field violence264 is administered 
according to a set of specific violations that have specific punishments 
based on the grade of the offense.265  Further, each grade has an explicit 
number of demerit points, which also contribute to developing the 
punishment.266  Players are given written notice of a charge and have 
three options: plead guilty, plead guilty to the offense but not guilty to 
the grade, or plead not guilty to the offense.267  Moreover, players are 
rewarded with a lesser point value if they plead guilty and get increased 
points for repeat offenses.268 
This system works quickly and effectively because the match review 
committee must submit the notice of offense the next business day after 
the match.269  The player then has one business day to respond either 
with a guilty plea or notice that he will fight the charge.270  If he fights it, 
the hearing is held the following day, with a potential for appeal for 
procedural infractions the day after the hearing.271  In all, this process 
takes a maximum of four days to complete the entire process of 
discipline and appeal.272 
 
263. AUSTRALIAN RUGBY LEAGUE COMM’N, NRL JUDICIARY CODE OF PROCEDURE: 
POLICY STATEMENT NO 1 OF 2012 (2012), available at http://media.dailytelegraph.com.au/m
ultimedia/2012/07/NRL_Judiciary_Polic.pdf; NAT’L RUGBY LEAGUE, CODE OF CONDUCT 
(2007), available at http://www.rugbyleague.com.au/nrl/nrl_code_of_conduct.pdf; Dobinson & 
Thorpe, supra note 226, at 110; NRL Judiciary Report, NRL.COM, http://www.nrl.com/nrlhq/r
eferencecentre/judiciary/tabid/10435/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 1, 2013). 
264. Rugby is one of the most violent games in the world, but it is no more violent than 
American football.  See Homa Khaleeli, American Football or Rugby: Which is More 
Dangerous?, SHORTCUTSBLOG (Jan. 28, 2013, 11:50 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/sp
ort/shortcuts/2013/jan/28/american-football-rugby-more-dangerous.  Thus, an analysis of the 
disciplinary system of violence in rugby should be just as easily administrated in football. 
265. Dobinson & Thorpe, supra note 226, at 124. 
266. Id.; NRL Judiciary Report, supra note 263. 
267. Dobinson & Thorpe, supra note 226, at 124. 
268. Id. at 124, 127. 
269. Id. at 126–27. 
270. Id. at 127. 
271. Id. 
272. Id.  The NFL currently has a similar system for on-field conduct, as evidenced by 
Ed Reed’s successful appeal.  Jeff Zrebiec & Aaron Wilson, Reed’s Suspension Lifted: After 
Successful Appeal on Helmet Hit, He Defends Hard-Nosed Style, BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 21, 
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The NRL has a judiciary branch that includes a Chairman, a 
Judiciary Counsel, and an Adjudicating Panel, which consists of three 
members.273  The Chairman decides all questions of law, evidence, and 
procedure, but does not participate in the decision of the appeal.274  This 
Chairman must be serving, or have served, as a judge in either an 
Australian state or federal court because the system is similar to a 
criminal case where there is an emphasis on the fairness of the 
proceedings to secure just outcomes.275  The Judiciary Counsel is 
responsible for prosecuting players on the league’s behalf.276  The 
Counsel is composed of former rugby league players who are also 
attorneys.277  This combination provides the legal formality to the 
proceedings and has a prosecutor who truly understands the position the 
players are in during the heat of competition.278  The ultimate decision of 
whether a charge should stand rests with the Adjudicating Panel, which, 
like the Counsel, is composed of former players.279  A group of three is 
selected from a pool of five, and acts as the jury in the case, responding 
to the cases presented by both sides and the burdens and standards 
explained by the Chairman.280 
Video evidence is usually presented and all the evidence and the 
grading are recorded so the Panel can follow precedent.281  The evidence 
of a particular case must be included in the notice of charge document 
that goes to the player so that he can develop a defense.282  Like a 
defendant in a criminal trial, the charged player’s previous suspensions 
and fines are excluded from the hearing unless the Panel determines the 
player is guilty, at which time the Panel needs to know the player’s 
 
2012, at D1.  Ed Reed is a Pro-Bowl caliber safety who, while playing for the Baltimore 
Ravens, was suspended by the League for an illegal hit because the League believed he had a 
history of illegal hits.  Id.  On appeal, the League reduced the suspension to a fine because 
Reed was able to show that he did not have the history as a repeat offender that the League 
initially believed he had.  Id. 
273. Dobinson & Thorpe, supra note 226, at 131. 
274. Id. 
275. Id. 
276. Id. at 133. 
277. Id. 
278. See id. at 133–34. 
279. Id. at 134. 
280. Id. at 134–35. 
281. Id. at 135. 
282. Id. at 138. 
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disciplinary past to decide the intensity of the punishment.283  If a player 
wishes to appeal, he has a week to ask for an appeal from the Chairman, 
who will grant it if there is a good likelihood of success.284 
An appeal is heard by the Appeals Committee, which can affirm, 
quash, find the player guilty of a lesser offense, or increase the penalty 
imposed on the player.285  These decisions are final and binding on the 
parties and no new evidence may be entered.286  Players must pay a 
$5,000 security fee before the appeal, which they get back only if they 
win, to avoid frivolous appeals.287  The Appeals Committee is a panel of 
three people: the President of the Appeals Committee, who must have 
served as a judge, and both the players association and the Chairman 
selecting one person each.288  This three-person panel has the final 
authority to determine whether the decision was reasonable and 
supported by evidence.289 
While some aspects of this system may not work in the United 
States, the specificity of rules and punishments as well as former player 
involvement in the process would vastly improve the current structure of 
discipline in American sports leagues.  While many of the leagues 
currently have quick appeals for on-field conduct, there are aspects of 
these three disciplinary systems that can make the American systems 
more fair, consistent, and efficient.290 
 
283. Id. 
284. Id. at 141–42. 
285. Id. at 142. 
286. Id. at 142–43. 
287. Id. at 143.  The NRL salary cap is $5.15 million for the twenty-five highest paid 
athletes.  Salary Cap Breakdown: NRL Payments for the Top 25 2013 Cap, NRL.COM, 
http://www.nrl.com/nrlhq/referencecentre/salarycap/tabid/10434/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 
4, 2013).  This equates to a maximum average salary of $176,000 per player, or just over 5% of 
the average MLB player’s salary, less than 3.5% of the average NBA player’s salary, 7.3% of 
the average NHL player’s salary, and only slightly higher than a typical NFL practice squad 
player.  See Joe Dorish, Average Salaries in the NBA, NFL, MLB, and NHL, YAHOO SPORTS 
(Nov. 12, 2011), http://sports.yahoo.com/nba/news?slug=ycn-10423863; Brian McIntyre, New 
England Patriots Have Top-Paid NFL Practice Squad, NFL.COM (Sept. 7, 2012, 7:52 AM), 
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap1000000059339/article/new-england-patriots-have-toppaid-
nfl-practice-squad; MLB Salaries, CBSSPORTS.COM, http://www.cbssports.com/mlb/salaries/ 
avgsalaries (last visited Oct. 4, 2013). 
288. Dobinson & Thorpe, supra note 226, at 143. 
289. Id. at 143–44. 
290. See MLB CBA, supra note 54, at art. XI, § C; NFL CBA, supra note 72, at art. 46. 
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V. APPLICABLE ASPECTS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE UNITED 
STATES LEGAL SYSTEM 
The structure of the U.S. court systems generally involves a lower 
court that initially hears cases and at least one appellate court in the 
jurisdiction that hears potential review.291  Traditionally, lower court 
determinations of fact face a clearly erroneous standard of review by 
appellate courts, whereas the lower court’s legal holdings are reviewed 
de novo.292  Further, a lower court judge’s discretionary decision is 
usually reviewed under an “abuse of discretion” standard.293  All appeals 
in this system are conducted by a completely separate court to reduce, 
and ideally eliminate, the potential for bias.294  The established appellate 
procedure not only serves to preserve justice, but also as a check on 
lower court judges.295  One of the biggest concerns about lower court 
judges is maintaining impartiality, or at least the perception of it.296 
Congress understands the importance of this perception, which is 
why it codified the requirement that a judge disqualify herself if her 
impartiality “might reasonably be questioned.”297  The judge is supposed 
to act sua sponte and recuse herself.298  However, if a judge does not 
recuse herself, either party may file a motion to remove the judge from 
the proceeding by filing an affidavit with the facts and reasons why the 
party believes the judge is biased.299  The goal is to eliminate bias and 
 
291. See 1 RALPH A. ROSSUM & G. ALAN TARR, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT 31 (8th ed. 2010); Structure of Federal Courts, 
USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.gov/educational-resources/get-informed/federal-court-
basics/structure-federal-courts.aspx (last visited Oct. 4, 2013). 
292. Kevin Casey et al., Standards of Appellate Review in the Federal Circuit: Substance 
and Semantics, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 279, 285–86 (2002); Chad M. Oldfather & Matthew M. 
Fernholz, Comparative Procedure on a Sunday Afternoon: Instant Replay in the NFL as a 
Process of Appellate Review, 43 IND. L. REV. 45, 54 (2009). 
293. Casey et al., supra note 292, at 286, 309–11; Oldfather & Fernholz, supra note 292, 
at 54. 
294. Oldfather & Fernholz, supra note 292, at 64. 
295. See id. at 66. 
296. Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge’s 
Impartiality “Might Reasonably Be Questioned,” 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 66–67 (2000).  
Other important features of the legal system include the right to be heard, notice of laws and 
charges, the right to cross-examine witnesses, and the right to receive a reasoned decision.  
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, DESIGN FOR LIBERTY: PRIVATE PROPERTY, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATI
ON, AND THE RULE OF LAW 20–21 (2011). 
297. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006). 
298. Abramson, supra note 296, at 70. 
299. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (2006); Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 
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enhance public confidence in the justice system by employing an 
objective test of whether a disinterested observer would significantly 
doubt the judge’s impartiality.300 
To demonstrate the importance of public confidence further, the 
American Bar Association (ABA) published a model rule titled: 
“Promoting Confidence in the Judiciary.”301  The rule states: “A judge 
shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the 
independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid 
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.”302  By including the 
appearance of impropriety, the ABA recognizes that public perception 
of the system is nearly as important, if not more so, than the justice of 
the system itself, and that the public will distrust a system that is not 
impartial.303  The language in that rule is very similar to the reasoning 
behind granting the commissioner a best interest power.304 
VI. AMERICAN SPORTS ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL (ASAT) 
The ASAT would incorporate some particularly effective 
components from each of the professional American sports CBAs as 
well as the international systems previously assessed in Part IV.  
However, various aspects of the ASAT would create new and unique 
processes for handling disciplinary appeals to make the system as fair, 
efficient, and effective as possible.  This Part will explain the structure of 
 
23–24 (1994). 
300. CHARLES GARDNER GEYH ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 4.05 (5th 
ed. 2013); Debra Lyn Bassett, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Appellate Courts, 87 
IOWA L. REV. 1213, 1233 (2002).  The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the objective 
reasonable prudent person standard to determine the judge’s ability to be impartial.  
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 887 (2009).  The Court found a judge must 
recuse himself if the case involved someone who had given him significant campaign 
contributions.  Id. at 886–87. 
301. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2011).  A concept first articulated by 
James Madison, who recognized that men cannot completely control their biases and must be 
protected from themselves for the good of the public.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 55 (James 
Madison) (Harvard University Press 2009).  Ironically, it was such a crisis of confidence that 
led to the MLB making Judge Landis the first commissioner.  See supra notes 25–27 and 
accompanying text. 
302. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2011) (asterisks omitted). 
303. Id. at R. 1.2 cmt. 3. 
304. Compare MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2011) (requiring that a 
judge act to promote public confidence in the independence of the judiciary), with MAJOR 
LEAGUE CONST. art. II, §§ 2–3 (2008), available at http://bizofbaseball.com/docs/MLCons 
ititutionJune2005Update.pdf (explaining the commissioner’s responsibility to promote the 
best interests of baseball). 
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the ASAT, including how the procedures would work, and will explore 
the potential feasibility of the proposed ASAT. 
A. The Creation and Maintenance of the ASAT 
Like the CAS and BAT, the ASAT would be an independent body 
with its own governing documents and code, regardless of the sport 
involved in the dispute.305  The separate code would establish the 
structure of the proceedings and codify rules that arbitrators must abide 
by when making decisions.  Similar to the CAS,306 the ASAT would be 
composed of a group of established arbitrators that have experience in 
one of the major North American arbitration associations,307 
international sports arbitral tribunals,308 a similarly structured court 
around the world, or any independent arbitrator who can show 
sufficiently related experience and education.309  The tribunal would be 
composed of at least ten original arbitrators (the Board), who would 
have to apply and be appointed by the participating leagues and players’ 
associations.310  Like the NRL structure, former-athletes could apply for 
a position on the ASAT if they can prove in their applications that they 
have legal experience or training, or related skills that would enable 
them to effectively adjudicate these types of hearings.311  Using a similar 
election policy as the CAS, the Board would then select ten more; that 
group of twenty would then select ten more, and so on until at least fifty 
arbitrators had been appointed.312  By having the Board select these 
arbitrators, it is much less likely that an arbitrator would feel a 
responsibility to rule on behalf of one of the parties in the dispute.  
 
305. See supra Part IV.A–B. 
306. See supra note 232 and accompanying text. 
307. For example, the International Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution, the 
AAA, and the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services. 
308. For example, the CAS, the BAT, and the International Arbitration Association.  
Additionally, anyone who has served as a league arbitrator would have sufficient experience 
to be considered. 
309. The decision regarding whether the independent arbitrator has sufficient 
experience and education would be at the discretion of the Board. 
310. Ideally the NBA, NBPA, MLB, MLBPA, NFL, NFLPA, NHL, and NHLPA would 
all participate, but there would be no bar on what league could participate.  The only 
requirement would be incorporating language into its governing documents giving the ASAT 
authority to function effectively. 
311. See Dobinson & Thorpe, supra note 226, at 133.  A fund would also be created from 
the fines to provide for athletes’ post-career legal education to help prepare athletes for this 
position. 
312. See supra note 231 and accompanying text. 
34609-m
qt_97-2 Sheet No. 154 Side A      03/17/2014   11:30:34
34609-mqt_97-2 Sheet No. 154 Side A      03/17/2014   11:30:34
C M
Y K
ABRAMS-FINAL (CORRECT MARCH) (DO NOT DELETE) 3/10/2014  12:33 PM 
2013] MAKING THE RIGHT CALL 513 
Whenever an arbitrator retired or was discharged, the members of the 
ASAT would have the duty to select a replacement if there were fewer 
than fifty left; if there were more than fifty, the members would have 
discretion as to whether to add a replacement.  Maintaining at least fifty 
qualified arbitrators is important to prevent any one arbitrator from 
dealing with a particular league too frequently. 
As in most of the organizations discussed previously, the arbitrators 
would be expected to perform their duties objectively and 
independently313 and would be subject to the standards of the code as 
well as the requirements of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).314  
Adapting the CAS and BAT policies,315 either party would have the 
right to challenge the decision based on the FAA requirements for 
disclosure, impartiality, abuse of power, and misconduct.316  This policy 
would provide a safeguard for players or leagues that do not get a fair 
hearing or decision.  While the decisions of the panels would be public, 
all proceedings, documents, and statistics, including the identity of the 
arbitrators, would be confidential, and if any party were to reveal any 
confidential information, that party would be subject to a substantial 
fine, similar to CAS decisions.317 
All arbitrators could be fired by any league or association during a 
specified week in the summer each year, similar to the NBA CBA;318 
however, unlike the current structures for the American professional 
sports leagues, this request for dismissal must be accompanied by just 
cause for termination.319  This requirement would protect arbitrators 
from retribution from one party simply because the arbitrator ruled 
against that party, and increase the public’s view of the integrity of the 
system.  These requests would be handled in a confidential manner so 
the arbitrator would be unaware of who requested the termination, but 
would know the reasoning for the request.  The Board would review the 
request and determine whether to keep the arbitrator on staff.  These 
 
313. BAT RULES, supra note 250, at R. 8.3; CAS STATUTES, supra note 227, § 18; MLB 
CBA, supra note 54, at art. XI, § A(9). 
314. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012). 
315. BAT RULES, supra note 250, at R. 8.3; CAS PROCEDURAL RULES, supra note 235, 
at R. 34. 
316. 9 U.S.C. § 10. 
317.  CAS PROCEDURAL RULES, supra note 235, at R. 43; CAS STATUTES, supra note 
227, § 19. 
318. See supra Part III.C. 
319. See supra Part III. 
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procedures would ensure that the accused arbitrators never learn the 
organization that accused them, so the arbitrators cannot develop a bias 
against the organization if the Board decides to keep the arbitrator on 
staff.  This system would prevent dismissals and requests without merit 
and bring accountability to the leagues requesting dismissal. 
Slightly altering the NBA system, which lets the commissioner 
decide on small fines and penalties,320 the ASAT would have at least 
three arbitrators on call for small issues that could be settled much more 
quickly than the large issues, which may require a full trial process.  The 
determination of which disputes would be considered small and which 
would be considered large would be handled by the leagues in their 
CBAs and not codified by the ASAT.321  Similar to BAT arbitrators, 
ASAT arbitrators would have the authority to broker an agreement 
between the parties, or make an independent decision.322  This approach 
would allow the leagues to determine which discipline they believe must 
be determined quickly and efficiently to maintain justice, such as cases 
the facts would be relatively straightforward.  Further, the leagues 
would define the issues and punishments that would require intensive 
fact-finding and a larger investigation, which would require a longer, 
more court-like trial.  Removing the commissioner entirely from the 
appeals procedure would bring greater integrity to each sport because it 
would remove the chance of bias or partiality, or at least the public’s 
perception of it. 
B. The Small Dispute Process 
The small issues would be handled by a single arbitrator, like BAT 
arbitrations.323  These small hearings would involve both parties and 
would be conducted via video or telephone conference to eliminate the 
costs and delay of travel.  The complainant would be required to 
provide written notice to both the ASAT and the opposing party, who 
would be required to file an answer within two business days.  The 
conference would take place at a time agreed upon by the parties, but 
no later than two business days after the ASAT received the answer and 
no more than five days after the filing of the complaint.  This timetable 
would ensure the efficient resolution of these disputes and would get 
 
320. See supra notes 195–96 and accompanying text. 
321. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
322. BAT RULES, supra note 250, at R. 12.3. 
323. Id. at R. 8.1. 
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innocent players back playing as early as possible.  Similar to the power 
of the NBA Commissioner, the arbitrator would have authority to 
affirm or reduce the league’s decision, but not to increase it.324  The 
parties would make the entirety of their arguments during this hearing, 
and there would be no required brief or discovery process because of 
the limited facts involved.  The parties would need to provide any 
evidence they believe necessary to convince the arbitrator with during 
this conference so the opposing party would have a chance to dispute it.  
Like the decisions of most of the leagues’ arbitrators, these decisions 
would be final and binding.325  Due to the limited fact-finding required, 
these smaller disputes would likely be resolved quickly.  All decisions 
would be documented to establish a system of precedent, so the disputes 
could be resolved fairly and referenced in future cases.  This 
documentation would make sure the players know exactly what type of 
conduct would make them liable for specific suspensions and fines and 
would eliminate the ambiguity that currently exists under the CBAs. 
C. The Large Dispute Process 
Large disputes would be heard by a panel of three impartial 
arbitrators, similar to CAS proceedings.326  Differing from the CAS 
system, these arbitrators would be randomly selected and an algorithm 
would be created to prevent any individual arbitrator from hearing 
disputes predominantly from one sport.327  Like the power of the NBA 
Commissioner,328 the panel would have authority to affirm or reduce the 
league’s decision, but not to increase it.  Additionally, comparable to the 
NRL system, these decisions would be documented and would set 
precedent for each league that would be applicable in similar future 
 
324. NBA CBA, supra note 192, at art. XXXI, § 9(a)(4). 
325. BAT RULES, supra note 250, at R. 16.5; CAS PROCEDURAL RULES, supra note 
235, at R. 46; MLB CBA, supra note 54, at art. XI, § B; NBA CBA, supra note 192, at art. 
XXXI, § 6; NFL CBA, supra note 72, at art. 46, § 2(d); Dobinson & Thorpe, supra note 226, 
at 142–43. 
326. CAS PROCEDURAL RULES, supra note 235, at R. 50. 
327. Id. at R. 40.2.  This algorithm would prevent the arbitrators from becoming too 
familiar with any particular league or players association, which would avoid any previous 
biases from coming into play even subconsciously.  The system benefits from the arbitrators’ 
legal and analytical skills rather than their familiarity with any particular sport.  
Unfortunately, the author is not a mathematician and unable to present an example of said 
algorithm. 
328. NBA CBA, supra note 192, at art. XXXI, § 9(a)(4). 
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situations per league.329  Moreover, the totality of the circumstances 
would come into play for each hearing to prevent a player who went 
through reasonable efforts to make sure he was not breaking the rules 
from being disciplined, like J.C. Romero.330  Thus, no punishments 
would be handed out with a strict liability standard, and all appellants 
would have the opportunity to truly clear their name. 
The ASAT would not hand out discipline; it would still be up to the 
individual leagues to determine the rules and punishments and to 
initially enforce those rules.  Instead, the tribunal would only be used 
when the punished player disputed the discipline and wished to appeal 
the decision.  The arbitrators would analyze the league’s decision based 
on the league’s governing documents and a reasoned brief submitted by 
the league.  This brief would provide the ASAT with any evidence, such 
as previous conduct or applicable precedent, that it would need to 
confirm the decision and so that the player could effectively make his or 
her defense, akin to the NRL system.331  Additionally, if the CBAs still 
had ambiguous language, like the NFL’s “flagrant and gratuitous” 
standard for increasing fines and suspensions,332 then the brief would 
need to clarify the explicit type of conduct that would result in the 
increased penalty by giving examples of past suspensions or fines for 
similar conduct by players in similar situations.  This brief would have to 
be submitted within five business days of the written notice of the 
player’s appeal to keep the process efficient. 
The hearing would take place between a week and ten days after the 
notice of appeal, and the parties would submit briefs to the ASAT panel 
at least two days in advance, similar to the NRL and NFL structures.333  
Though not required, a player would have the right to be represented by 
an attorney or a union representative.  The appellant player would have 
to prove that the league was being arbitrary and capricious, abusing its 
power, or not following its own rules in handing down the particular 
discipline.  The player could use the totality of the circumstances, 
including on- and off-court conduct, other players’ punishments, and 
 
329. Dobinson & Thorpe, supra note 226, at 135. 
330. See supra notes 49–53, 64 and accompanying text. 
331. Dobinson & Thorpe, supra note 226, at 138. 
332. NFL CBA, supra note 72, at art. 46, § 1(d). 
333. Id. at art. 46, § 2(i); Dobinson & Thorpe, supra note 226, at 124–27.  As opposed to 
the NBA system, which allows for a much greater timeframe.  NBA CBA, supra note 192, at 
art. XXXI, § 4. 
34609-m
qt_97-2 Sheet No. 156 Side A      03/17/2014   11:30:34
34609-mqt_97-2 Sheet No. 156 Side A      03/17/2014   11:30:34
C M
Y K
ABRAMS-FINAL (CORRECT MARCH) (DO NOT DELETE) 3/10/2014  12:33 PM 
2013] MAKING THE RIGHT CALL 517 
any other evidence that could show injustice.  The league would also 
have the right to participate in the hearing, but would not be required to 
participate if the evidence submitted in the brief was sufficient.334  Like 
the CAS policy, discovery requests would be granted at the panel’s 
discretion.335  Further, the player would be entitled to any evidence used 
in the investigation, much like the MLB system.336  The hearing would 
not have a particular time limit, but must allow for each party to present 
all of its evidence to ensure justice.  Arbitrators would publish a 
reasoned decision for each case, which the league could then use as a 
basis for how to handle future situations.  These publications would be 
anonymous, like the CAS decisions, unless the appellant waived his or 
her right to privacy.  This documentation would hopefully prevent 
future disputes because players would better understand the likely 
penalties for their actions and the league would be able to look at 
precedential decisions to determine future discipline.  Like the decisions 
of most of the leagues’ arbitrators, these decisions would be final and 
binding.337 
D. Funding the ASAT and Understanding the Fees 
The Board and arbitrators would be paid using only the arbitration 
rates, for which there would be two base rates, one for small issues and 
one for large, and additional incremental increases as would be 
explained in the code.338  These rates would be determined by the 
average of the fair market rates of the major North American 
arbitration agencies.  These fees would be shared equally by the union 
representing the player and the league, but would be refunded to the 
winning party by the opposing side.  Any fines that the panel affirms 
would be payable to the league and the league would follow its own 
CBA to determine the use of those funds.  Embracing an element of the 
 
334. The league could be represented by any active member of the commissioner’s office 
who participated in the original disciplinary decision. 
335. CAS PROCEDURAL RULES, supra note 235, at R. 44.3. 
336. MLB CBA, supra note 54, at art. XII, § D. 
337. BAT RULES, supra note 250, at R. 16.5; CAS PROCEDURAL RULES, supra note 
235, at R. 46; MLB CBA, supra note 54, at art. XI, § B; NBA CBA, supra note 192, at art. 
XXXI, § 6; NFL CBA, supra note 72, at art. 46, § 2(d); Dobinson & Thorpe, supra note 226, 
at 142–43. 
338. The incremental expenses could be imposed for excessively long hearings, 
procedures to strike a particular arbitrator for a previous relationship with a party, or similar 
circumstances that would make that particular hearing longer and more difficult than the 
norm, similar to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
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NFL’s CBA,339 any fine imposed by the arbitrators for conduct against 
the rules of the ASAT, such as disclosure of confidential information, 
unreasonable delay, or bad faith, would be directly paid to the ASAT, 
which would delegate the funds to one of five selected charities based on 
the recommendation of the opposing party.340  Like the BAT system, the 
arbitrator would determine what proportion of expenses each side 
would be required to pay, with the exception that parties would be 
responsible for their own witnesses.341  Further, the panel could award 
attorney’s fees if it found that one party acted in bad faith or filed a 
frivolous claim.  These rules would make sure that no athlete would be 
unable to bring a case due to expense, and would guarantee that the 
arbitrators would be paid a fair rate, and that neither party would 
unduly delay the proceedings or act with malice because of the 
repercussions of fines. 
E. The Potential Obstacles to Creating the ASAT 
Historically, CBA negotiations have often focused around monetary 
issues.342  The current state of the economy has only made these issues 
more important and made it more difficult to come to an agreement.343  
These issues have included free agency, salary caps, wage restrictions, 
and revenue splits.344  In fact, during the most recent collective 
bargaining negotiations between the NFL and NFLPA, the most 
significant changes were in terms of the revenue split, the salary cap and 
minimum spending requirements, bonus forfeitures, rookie 
compensation, guaranteed contracts, and drug testing.345 
While the NFL Commissioner’s disciplinary power had been a 
popular topic of discussion and most players were not happy with it, the 
new CBA left the structure nearly unchanged.346  This phenomenon is 
 
339. NFL CBA, supra note 72, at art. 46, § 5(c). 
340. One of these would be an athlete education fund, which would grant scholarships to 
retired athletes looking to gain a legal education to eventually become an arbitrator. 
341. BAT RULES, supra note 250, at R. 17.3. 
342. See 1 LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS § 4.9 (Gary A. Uberstine 
ed., 2012); Chris Deubert et al., All Four Quarters: A Retrospective and Analysis of the 2011 
Collective Bargaining Process and Agreement in the National Football League, 19 UCLA ENT. 
L. REV. 1, 7 (2012). 
343. Parlow, supra note 2, at 203. 
344. Deubert et al., supra note 342, at 11–14. 
345. Id. at 44–63, 65–66. 
346. Id. at 63–65. 
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not unique to the NFL; the new NBA CBA also involved mostly 
changes to monetary issues, and did not address disciplinary 
provisions.347  Similarly, the new MLB Basic Agreement involved a 
variety of changes to monetary issues, but, other than a change to drug 
testing, no other mentions of disciplinary provisions.348  These most 
recent CBA negotiations suggest that disciplinary issues are not very 
important to the players or the players’ unions. 
Since it is highly unlikely that during the next round of CBA 
negotiations disciplinary appeals will suddenly become more important, 
it is probably up to the leagues to take the issue of fair appellate 
procedure up themselves.  However, doing so would involve giving up a 
significant power that the leagues have over the players, which would 
likely be met by the leagues asking for the players to give up more 
money in exchange, which they are very unlikely to do.  Therefore, it is 
unlikely that there will be any disciplinary changes in the major 
American sports leagues, let alone something as drastic as this 
Comment proposes; however, similar systems have been established in 
other nations and internationally, showing that it can be done.349  
Unfortunately, this means that the players and the fans will likely have 
to deal with a system that is unfair, inconsistent, and inflexible. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Whether the ASAT is a realistic concept that can effectively be 
incorporated into the American sports governance structure remains to 
be seen.  One thing is certain, changes need to be made.  The current 
disciplinary provisions in the CBAs of the four major American 
professional sports leagues are ambiguous, at best, as to what conduct 
will result in punishment, and the extent of the punishment that will be 
handed down.350  The NFL and NBA have attempted to create conduct 
policies, which work to varying degrees,351 but that does not fully 
 
347. Larry Coon, Breaking Down Changes in New CBA, ESPN.COM (Dec. 3, 2011, 9:01 
PM), http://espn.go.com/nba/story/_/page/CBA-111128/how-new-nba-deal-compares-last-one. 
348. See Anthony DiComo, Key Points of Collective Bargaining Agreement, MLB.COM 
(Nov. 22, 2011, 2:45 PM), http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20111122&content_id=26
026776. 
349. See DEBORAH HEALEY, SPORT AND THE LAW 177–81 (4th ed. 2009). 
350. NFL CBA, supra note 72, at art. 46, § 1(a), (d); see also MLB CBA, supra note 54, 
at art. XII, § A–B, NBA CBA, supra note 192, at art. XXXI, § 9. 
351. NBA CBA, supra note 192, at art. VI; NFL PCP, supra note 78; see also supra text 
accompanying note 185. 
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encompass the breadth of conduct for which they have doled out 
discipline.  Too many of these decisions are arbitrary and without 
sufficient reasoning.352 
Furthermore, the system of appeals that allows the commissioner’s 
office to hear an appeal on discipline it handed out is a clear conflict of 
interest that must be removed from the system to give it more 
integrity.353  As was evidenced in Part II, a commissioner will rarely, if 
ever, overturn or reduce a punishment that he had a hand in creating.354  
The current state of disciplinary systems in the American sports world is 
in disarray, as exemplified by the Bounty-Gate mess in the NFL,355 the 
Ryan Braun situation in the MLB,356 and the punishment of the San 
Antonio Spurs in the NBA,357 as well as many other situations.  This 
problem will not likely be fixed by each league’s next CBA unless it is 
explicitly brought up beforehand.  CBA negotiations too often focus 
only on the money and leave the rest of the CBA alone.358  Thus, it is a 
burden on the leagues themselves to more explicitly lay out what 
conduct will be disciplined, and the specifics of the punishments, similar 
to the NRL governing documents.359  Unfortunately, leagues are unlikely 
to do so because it would require transparency in the disciplinary 
process and giving up discretionary power. 
Therefore, although the proposed arbitral body would increase the 
fairness, consistency, and flexibility of the current systems, it will not 
likely be implemented and the disciplinary procedures of each league is 
 
352. See supra notes 78–79, 86–90, 118–22 and accompanying text. 
353. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
354. See supra Part II. 
355. See supra notes 85–95 and accompanying text. 
356. See Belson, supra note 23. 
357. See supra notes 126–29 and accompanying text. 
358. As evidenced by the NHL’s recent CBA negotiations that resulted in a lockout, as 
well as the recent NBA and NFL lockouts that produced little to no change in the disciplinary 
provisions of the CBA.  See Howard Beck, N.B.A. Reaches Tentative Deal to Save Season, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2011, at A1 (detailing changes in NBA CBA after lockout); Katie 
Carrera, The NHL CBA: Analyzing What’s New, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/sports/capitals/2013/cba/index.html (detailing the 
major changes to the NHL CBA after the lockout); Mike Garafolo, NFL, Referees End 
Lockout After Reaching New Labor Deal, USA TODAY (Sept. 27, 2012, 1:52 AM), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/nfl/story/2012/09/27/nfl-referees-end-lockout-after-
reaching-new-labor-deal/57846906/1 (detailing the major issues negotiated during the NFL 
referee’s lockout). 
359. Dobinson & Thorpe, supra note 226, at 110–11; see also supra notes 263–68 and 
accompanying text. 
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likely to remain unchanged until a tremendous scandal makes it 
necessary in order to preserve the integrity of the game. 
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